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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on national symbols and the communicative role they play in social 
change as it manifests itself in social movements and revolutions.  Symbols in social 
movements and revolutions play a crucial role in binding people and groups together, 
allowing them to focus and form a collective consciousness.  In order to contextualize 
such symbols within a specific national community and provide examples, the author 
chose her native Poland as a case study.  The Polish national symbols included in this 
study are the cross, the Black Madonna of Częstochowa, and the contested landscape of 
the National Stadium in Warsaw.  The framework used in this study to analyze the 
selected national symbols is Kramer’s theory of dimensional accrual of disassociation 
and the method is a semiotic analysis. Based on the discussion of national symbols in 
Poland, the study offers guidelines for how to recognize what national symbols are and 
to understand how they can affect social change. 
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Introduction 
Symbols are ubiquitous in human communication since they are communication.  
Whether it is the utterance of words and usage of language, nonverbal communication, 
or the presence of artifacts, we witness the conveying of meaning through symbolic 
expressions all the time.  Symbols fall into different categories and are studied by 
different disciplines, such as cultural anthropology, linguistics, literature, and media 
studies, to name a few, which have all informed and defined some of the more notable 
theories of symbols and the study thereof.  
Symbols in social movements and revolutions play a crucial role in binding 
people and groups together, allowing them to focus and form a collective 
consciousness.  Symbols bind people at an emotional level by evoking passion; they go 
to the roots of identity.  Another attribute of symbols is their potential resilience, 
especially when they emerge from the underground, progressing to victorious and 
potentially monumental symbols over time.  Some monumental symbols are associated 
with nations, thus becoming national symbols; some are remnants of ancient 
civilizations that have not necessarily morphed into nations.  The use of symbolism has 
played a part in mobilizing forces of social movements on an international scale, but 
this study will mainly focus on symbols that have a national character, providing 
examples of the communicative nature of national symbols.  Although there is some 
literature that mentions national symbols, primarily nationalism literature, only a few 
studies have investigated the nature and influence of national symbols (Geisler, 2005; 
McCrone & McPherson, 2009; Mock, Elgenius, 2011; Mock, 2012).  There are a 
variety of studies that revolve around different kinds of symbols and symbolism, but 
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“national symbolism is set apart from other types of symbolism by its reference to the 
nation, its claims to a specific history, sovereignty and distinctiveness” (Elgenius, 2011, 
p. 9).  Also, the studies referenced above had different goals than the one proposed here. 
Two of the four studies referenced above discuss the role national symbols have in the 
construction of national identity (Geisler, 2005; Mock, 2012), one discusses national 
symbols as constructing and mobilizing national identity (McCrone & McPherson, 
2009), and another one focuses on nation building qualities of national symbols 
(Elgenius, 2011).  Studies of national symbols usually focus on national flags, national 
days, and national anthems.  This study focuses on symbols that are not directly tied to 
the nation as a state, but more to the nation as an ethno-cultural community.  In order to 
contextualize such symbols within a specific national community and provide examples 
of their communicative role, the author chose her native Poland as a case study.  The 
reason for choosing ethno-cultural aspects of nationhood in this case study is justified 
by Poland’s continuous existence as a nation even when its geopolitical existence as 
nation-state was disrupted several times.  
Selecting Poland as a Case Study 
The rationale for choosing Poland as a case study is its culture of resistance 
throughout history, a mechanism that seems to have been holding this European country 
together in a long string of events that aimed for the opposite.  Poland has been 
subjected to three partitions, with the longest one taking it off the political map for 123 
years, as well as attacks and occupation during the two World Wars which culminated 
in an oppressive rule by the communist regime.  That is not to say that Poland has 
always been in the victim’s role, characterized as a “crucified nation” (Davies, 2008, p. 
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11), an image that is also used at times by some Poles who do not accept Poland’s role 
in the massacres in Jedwabne during World War II, for instance (Polonsky & Michlic, 
2004).  However, Poland lends itself as a case study to this particular research on 
national symbols and social change since it is a country and a culture that despite its 
differences at times, seems to have a curious sense of patriotic solidarity that allowed it 
to fight its oppressors and recover from its wounds.  That sense of patriotism, national 
consciousness, pride, and solidarity is at the core of Poland’s culture and identity.  
Poland’s triple disappearance and return to the political map is speaking to its cultural 
resistance and memory as a nation without a state throughout history, as does the 
peaceful Solidarity movement to the nature of revolutions.  Zubrzycki (2006) notes the 
lack of studies of Polish nationalism in sociology, which is of importance here as the 
author of this study focuses on social processes and consequences as well.     
Polish nationalism, despite its richness and complexity, has received relatively 
little attention in the field [of sociology].  Few studies are devoted to the Polish 
case, and even fewer focus on the post-Communist period, despite the massive 
geopolitical import of this transition…the great majority of works on Polish 
nationalism focus on political philosophy and Polish nationalism’s ideological 
roots…To date, there exists no book-length study of nationalism and religion in 
Poland, or of nationalism in post-Communist Poland.  (pp. 28-29) 
 
Furthermore, what makes Poland interesting as a case study for nationalism has been 
aptly observed by Ash (2002), when referring to the “Partitions” in 1772, 1793 and 
1795: “Poland disappeared from the map of Europe as an independent state for the next 
one hundred and twenty-three years.  But it refused to disappear as a nation” (p. 4).  
Poland’s continuous fight for independence throughout history is quite remarkable, 
leading to “one of the basic components of Polish culture and helped to create a national 
mythology that glorified struggle, self-sacrifice, and death in the cause of the 
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homeland” (Paczkowski, 2003, p. 1).  The national sentiment that did not erupt in 
violence during the last social movement was significant in leading up to the demise of 
communism.  Poland has been often times described as an anomaly among the former 
Soviet satellite states. 
The Polish situation had its own peculiar features.  In the 1970s the Polish 
opposition shared with other Eastern European oppositional movements a 
common disability—it could not express itself through open political channels 
(political parties, clubs, or trade unions).  Yet the intensity of social activism in 
Poland, including underground political debates, clandestine publications, and 
independent ceremonies and demonstrations far surpassed anything created in 
other Eastern European countries.  Having been unable to practice politics, 
Polish oppositionists often chose to express themselves through the “cultural” 
medium of symbolic public actions.  (Kubik, 1994, p. 6) 
 
In addition to the historical and socio-political factors that demonstrate the unique 
nature of this case study, the author of this study is a native of Poland who speaks the 
language, thus having access to materials that have not been translated from Polish. The 
author has also been living in Poland during the latter part of Solidarity’s activism 
(1980-1989) as well as visited her native country following the events of 1989.  Based 
on this case study, the author discusses directions and implications for the study of 
national symbols and social change that can be applied to other contexts.  
 To understand the significance of national symbols in any given nation, the 
identity of that nation has to be examined.  The identity of a collective, such as that of a 
nation, is shaped by symbols, sometimes referred to as cultural artifacts, which 
fundamentally contribute to the narratives of a nation’s memory.  The word monument 
has its origin in the Latin form of monere, which means “to remind” or “to warn.”  
Hence the resilience of monumental symbols, amongst others, the meaning of which is 
stored in the memory of a collective.  This idea of a symbol system, and the meaning of 
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those symbols being stored in memory have been interpreted in various ways.  The 
interpretive lens used in this study to discern some of the logic behind the patterns of 
national symbolism and to unveil the structures that contribute to the occurrence and 
meaning thereof is the field of semiotics, which is discussed in more detail in the next 
section as well as in the methodology section.   
Semiotics: An Overview 
This study is a semiotic analysis conjoined with a hermeneutics of national 
symbols in Poland.  This section serves as an overview of why semiotics is a fitting 
methodology for the present study, and to introduce several semiotic concepts that are 
pertinent to this study.  Although semiotics has been described as mostly theoretical, 
semioticians have tried to establish and designate codes and conventions that would 
classify and organize signs in a more systematic manner.  Semiotic principles become 
quite practical when applied to social realities where an interpretation based on 
empirical evidence can contribute to a better understanding of those social realities.  
Such contributions, particularly when the questions raised by the researcher pertain to 
societal issues and the answers can be contested and applied to other contexts, have 
merit and add to the validity of the methodological approach. 
We learn from semiotics that we live in a world of signs and we have no way of 
understanding anything except through signs and the codes into which they are 
organized.  Through the study of semiotics, we become aware that these signs 
and codes are normally transparent and disguise our task in ‘reading’ them….In 
defining realities signs serve ideological functions.  Deconstructing and 
contesting realities of signs can reveal whose realities are privileged and whose 
are suppressed.  (Chandler, 2002, pp. 14-15, italics in original)   
 
In this study of national symbols in Polish society some of the historically privileged 
realities are discussed as they emerged through nationalist discourse.  The social 
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construction of these realities was achieved through symbolic manipulation of public 
events that were organized by the representatives of the communist regime.  
Semiotics is most commonly described as the study of signs and “although the 
interest in signs and the way they communicate has a long history…modern semiotic 
analysis can be said to have begun with two men—Swiss linguist Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1857-1913) and American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)” 
(Berger, 1998, pp. 3-4).  The term semiology mostly refers to the linguistic tradition 
since Saussure and semiotics has been used to refer to the philosophical tradition of the 
theory of signs since Peirce, which later on became the dominant term for the study of 
signs and has been adopted in 1969 as the general term that comprises the “whole field 
of research in the traditions of both semiology and general semiotics” (Nöth, 1995, p. 
14).  
Semiology, in the Saussurean tradition, is a study of existing conventional, 
communicative systems.  Following the linguistic tradition, these systems have been 
expanded to include languages that go beyond the spoken and written word.  For 
example, stop lights and semaphores are semiotic systems and they are all modes of 
communication, which allow us to function through their intelligibility as we negotiate 
the world.  Semiotics studies everything that is understood as a language made up of a 
system of signs.  According to Saussure (1966), language does not belong to the speaker 
as it is not a “private” semiotic system.  He argues that language is conventional and 
belongs in the public sphere; it belongs to all of us.  Since it is public and does not 
belong to a private person who can make things up, and because it is conventional, it is 
communicative.  It is something we can use and share.  Following Saussure’s argument, 
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we do not speak language; language is something virtual that we can use.  Thus, we 
infer from speech, speech is what we do, it is how we use language.   
According to Saussure (1966), the relationship between the signified (concept) 
and the signifier (sound-image; word) is necessary, but arbitrary.  He posited that the 
signified and the signifier formed an indivisible sign.  As such, we put the signs 
together by taking those binary relationships (between concepts and sound images) and 
compose them in a sequence, which is how we speak.  The idea that we take a signifier 
and link it to the implied, the idea that a word signifies a concept or idea and not an 
object is not new, it was fully developed in John Locke’s Essay on Human 
Understanding.  Saussure took that conventional thought, adapted it, and made use of it.  
Saussure’s more original contribution consists of two things he said about the sign: first, 
the signified-signifier relationship is arbitrary; second, the way we know one sign from 
another is either studying language in the aggregate (cluster of signs exist in 
associational relation to each other), or studying it in speech acts whereby signs exist 
next to each other in a sequence.  The way we understand what a sign is, is differential, 
hence Saussure’s contribution: the sign, which is tied up in this relationship between 
signified and signifier, is both arbitrary and differential.  Saussure (1966) refers to the 
latter as “two correlative qualities” (p. 118).   
Saussure, like the Russian formalists, tried to establish semiology as a science of 
signs to bring some order into the study of linguistics.  He wanted language to be 
understood differentially, in the variety of ways in which language organizes signs.  We 
need signs to be differential so that we can distinguish between all the signs we use in 
any communicative sequence.  In other words, signs are differential when they are not 
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linked to natural things or other signs by natural means.  We can only know a unit of 
language, which we use to communicate with others negatively; we know it only 
because it is not everything else. We know things and recognize them for what they are, 
but we can only know what they are because of the context in which they are not those 
other things, those other signs.  The example of a red light has been referenced by 
Saussure, Eco, and others, as it is a convention within a system of differences.  That is 
how we know how to read the sign.  Lévi-Strauss (1955) coined the term gross 
constituent unit, which influences the meaning of the sign in a semiotic system.  This 
makes the sign arbitrary in general, but not so in a specific context because “the true 
constituent units of a myth are not the isolated relations but bundles of such relations 
and it is only as bundles that these relations can be put to use and combined so as to 
produce a meaning” (p. 431, italics in original).  Another example of these arbitrary but 
contextual relations is a Christmas tree, which, as a sign, can only be understood in a 
cultural context.  It is part of a semiotic system where the tree can be known 
negatively/differentially as a not-menorah, a not-kinara, and so forth. 
A lot of times we assume meaning to be common knowledge because we are 
familiar with a sign, but when someone enters the conversation and does not share the 
knowledge, we have to ask ourselves what the meaning of the sign is and how do we 
know what it means to us.  What makes a national symbol a national symbol, and how 
do I know that?  It is part of a cultural system, a semiosis.  Although we might not 
doubt that we know signs as something, the question that needs to be addressed is how 
do we know them.  When we need to know something in particular, to distinguish it 
from other signs, we need to know it negatively.  Otherwise, if we do not know a sign 
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negatively, we do not know what differentiates that sign from other signs, it becomes 
difficult to know the sign’s meaning and that changes communication.  It can distort 
communication, cause a delay in communication, or stop it altogether because we do 
not know the sign and thus cannot proceed.   
Semiotics, even with its limitations, offers us a way to understand how we know 
what we know.  Also, we only know the signs we know if we know the semiotic system 
they belong to.  So, if I do not know the system of signs that a national symbol as a sign 
belongs to, the symbol does not have meaning to me.  The intelligibility of the sign 
system is achieved through its conventionality.  We cannot mess with conventional 
systems by imposing our individual will/agency and expecting it to change.  In the case 
of an attempt to modify or create a sign through individual agency, the respective 
community needs to consent to the modification or creation of a sign in order for the 
sign to have any meaning.   
A significant difference between Saussure’s and Peirce’s approach to 
conceptualizing sign models is the dyadic-triadic dichotomy.  Saussure proposed a 
dyadic model of the sign where the sign (signe) correlated to the dyad of the signifier 
(signifiant) and the signified (signifié), the sign vehicle and meaning, respectively.  
Peirce’s correlates to the sign included the representamen (sign vehicle), the interpretant 
(sense), and the object (referent).  Nöth (1995) gives a synopsis of the dyadic sign, 
stating that it is not always possible to provide a definitive distinction between dyadic 
and tryadic sign models and that there is a  
zone of vagueness whenever a third correlate is mentioned but not 
systematically incorporated into the semiotic theory.  Saussure’s model is the 
prototype of a dyadic model.  Although he mentions the “chose” in addition to 
the signifier and the signified, he rejects it as a third correlate of the sign.  
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Hjelmslev, while discussing reference in the domain of content-substance, also 
remains essentially dyadic in his concept of the sign.  Furthermore, there are 
semioticians who postulate two aspects of the sign but consider the relation 
between sign vehicle and meaning to be the third component. (p. 87) 
 
As for the triadic sign models, Nöth (1995) argues that those are reducible to dyads 
since they can either be subsequent or alternative dyads.  He remarks that Locke’s 
definition of dyads “implies two subsequent but still potentially independent dyads” 
meaning that “words are signs of ideas and ideas are signs of things”.  He also points 
out the distinction Anselm made “between significatio, the relation between word and 
concept, and appellatio, the relation between word and thing, implies two alternative 
dyads”.  Nöth furthermore observes that although the subsequent or alternative dyads 
present a theory that words can have either sense or reference, others have suggested the 
concept of genuine triads “claiming that there is always some sense and reference in 
signs”.  The idea of genuine triads is “based on the concept of mediation…: a third 
correlate is related to first via a second”.  This triadic structure of the sign has been 
presented in a diagram, referred to as the semiotic triangle, which shows the “three 
correlates of the sign in the order (1) sign vehicle, (2) sense, and (3) referent” (p. 89).  
 In semiotics, there is no uniform typology of signs.  According to Nöth (1995), 
finding a common terminology is only part of the problem.  He claimed that “it is also 
due to the multidimensionality of the criteria on which typologies of signs are an 
integral part of the semiotic theory of their authors” (p. 107).  In Saussure’s theory, 
signs are made up of sounds and images that he referred to as signifiers and the 
corresponding concepts as signifieds. He noted 
I call the combination of a concept and a sound-image a sign, but in current 
usage the term generally designated only a sound-image, a word, for example…I 
propose to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace 
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concept and sound-image respectively by signified [signifié] and signifier 
[signifiant]; the last two terms have the advantage of indicating the opposition 
that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts.  
As regards sign, if I am satisfied with it, this is simply because I do not know of 
any word to replace it, the ordinary language suggesting no other.  (Nöth, 1966, 
p. 67) 
 
Peirce’s theory included three different kinds of signs: icons, indexes, and symbols.  In 
this trichotomy, icons indicate resemblence, indexes denote cause and effect, and 
symbols are based on conventions.  Eco (1976) proposed to define a sign as “everything 
that, on the grounds of a previously established social convention, can be taken as 
something standing for something else” (p. 16, italics in original).   
This study focuses on symbols as signs, looking at the nature of symbolic 
meanings from the connotational perspective of symbolism, which “defines the symbol 
as a sign to whose primary signifier a secondary meaning is added” (Nöth, 1995, p. 
119).  Nöth described the symbolic as the connotative as a view of symbolism which 
“characterizes symbols in contradistinction to other signs as having a ‘surplus of 
meaning’” and points out that “this theory is not incompatible with the iconic theory of 
the symbol, but the criterion of similarity is not essential to the nature of the connotation 
in this definition” (p. 118).  The inclusion of connotation and denotation in the concepts 
of signified and signifier has been credited to Barthes and Hall (Moriarty, 2005).  In her 
chapter on visual semiotics theory, Moriarty (2005) described the concept of denotation 
as “the direct, specific, or literal meaning we get from a sign.  It is a description or 
representation of the signified—that is, language (or visual) specifically about the 
object” and connotation is the “meaning that is evoked by the object, that is, what it 
symbolizes on a subjective level” (p. 231).  She also mentioned that in Barthes’ work, 
“connotation reflects cultural meanings, mythologies, and ideologies” (p. 231) which is 
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expressed through a first and second level of meaning, or a “surplus of meaning”, as 
indicated earlier. 
Symbol Theories 
Symbols are usually described as arbitrary, which they are and have to be to a 
certain extent, as indicated earlier in the discussion of signs.  Symbols mean different 
things to different people in different contexts.  However, symbols cannot be entirely 
arbitrary or else there would be no meaningful communication.  If any given symbol 
could mean anything to anybody, communication would become very difficult, if not 
impossible, and society as we know it would fall apart.    
In his semiotics of cultural forms, Cassirer (1944) studied the embodiment and 
appearance of meaning in human life.  His concept of homo symbolicum, derived from 
animal symbolicum, is based on the premise that the level of association between sign 
and meaning varies.  The way signs and their meanings are connected depends on the 
transcendental nature of human language.  Cassirer asserted that animals have the 
means to express emotions, they have not reached the next step from “subjective to 
objective, from affective to propositional language” (p. 30), thus remaining in the pre-
linguistic spectrum.  It is a uniquely human capacity to cognitively process 
propositional language.  According to Cassirer, we need to distinguish between 
signs/signals and symbols.  Animals react to and can distinguish between signals, which 
can be seen in dogs interacting with their masters, for instance.  But “conditioned 
reflexes are not merely very far from but even opposed to the essential character of 
human symbolic thought” (p. 32).  As human beings we share a symbol system through 
continuous communication that is embedded in the communities we are born into; 
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communication makes identity possible.  Language and myth are related phenomena as 
one needs the symbol system of a language to create the narrative of a myth.  
Eco (1984) generally distanced himself from Saussure’s semiology, Levi-
Strauss’ structuralism, as well as from binary links such as between signifier and 
signified, and between sign, code and dictionary semantics.  Instead, he advocated the 
process of unlimited semiosis as better suited to interpret signs and texts. His concept of 
the encyclopedia of codes can be seen as a revision of Pierce’s idea of infinite semiosis 
where signs continue generating signs ad infinitum, thus pointing to the nature of 
semiotics as a continuous process, which can be interrupted but not necessarily ended.  
Eco’(1992) expresses his perspective regarding the limits of interpretation in a lecture 
on overinterpretation.  He states: 
It is clear that I am trying to keep a dialectical link between intentio operis and 
intentio lectoris.  The problem is that, if one perhaps knows what is meant by 
“intention of the reader,” it seems more difficult to define abstractly what is 
meant by “intention of the text.”  The text’s intention is not displayed by the 
textual surface.  Or, if it is displayed, it is so in the sense of the purloined letter.  
One has to decide to “see” it.  Thus it is possible to speak of the text’s intention 
only as a result of a conjecture on the part of the reader.  The initiative of the 
reader basically consists in making a conjecture about the text’s intention.  A 
text is a device conceived in order to produce its model reader…A text can 
foresee a model reader entitled to try infinite conjectures.  (p. 64) 
  
Eco’s shift from a semiotics of communication to a semiotics of signification was 
initiated by his observation that dictionary-like semantics are too static and the notion of 
encyclopedia allows for a more dynamic model of abduction, or inference.  That shift, 
according to Eco, allows us then to move past the linear connection of signifier and 
signified.  Moving away from sign systems that focused on generating messages, the 
field of semiotics has been more concerned semiotics since the 1970s with the way 
those messages are being interpreted (de Lauretis, 1984).   
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The reason why this paradigmatic shift makes sense is because hermeneutics is 
presumed by semiotics.  Eco, and other semioticians, understood the limits of semiotics, 
thus going beyond explaining meaning through difference presented in binary 
oppositions.  Although binary oppositions and explaining meaning through difference 
are important, the conventions that binary oppositions are based on need to be put in 
context.  If we are not familiar with a convention or tradition, then trying to understand 
the connotation that a particular symbol has for a particular community, such as a 
nation, becomes quite challenging.  This is where Gadamer’s (1975) perspective on 
difference and convention based in his philosophy of hermeneutics is useful.  He 
acknowledges that conventions exist, but he also points out that they are real. 
Gadamer’s notion of the hermeneutic circle includes the relationship between a reader 
and a text, as well as a relationship between a part and a whole.  Thus, when reading a 
text, we take a part (a sentence, for example) and immediately form an opinion about 
this part with respect to an imagined or supposed whole; the whole changes as we keep 
reading more and more parts.  Therefore, according to Gadamer, “understanding is 
already interpretation” where we have created a hermeneutic horizon “within which the 
meaning of a text comes to force” (p. 397).  The circularity of this interpretive 
engagement has to do with moving back and forth between a certain preconception 
about the whole that we form from studying a part, moving then to the part, back to the 
whole, back to the part, and so forth, in a circular pattern.   
The circular pattern involves our particular historical horizon (relationship 
between present and past) and some other historical horizon we are trying to come to 
terms with.  We refer back and forth to what we know about the world before we 
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engage a text, what the text seems to be saying in relation to that which we know, how 
it might change my sense of what we know by referring back from what we know 
continuously to an understanding of the way in which the past text speaks.  It is 
important to note that hermeneutics does not just take place across a historical bridge; it 
can also take place across a social or cultural bridge.  When we engage each other in 
conversation we are still performing a hermeneutic act.  I have to try to understand what 
you are saying and I have to refer it to what I want to say, and the circuit of 
communication between us has to stay open as a result of this mutual and developing 
understanding of what we are talking about.  That also applies to conversations across 
cultures.  Gadamer (1975) asserts,  
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting.  He projects a 
meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the 
text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with 
particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-
projection, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates 
into the meaning, is understanding what is there.  (p. 266) 
 
Hence, we cannot seem to be able to get away from the preliminary conceptions about 
things (there are useful/useless preconceptions, prejudices to let us into the circle).  The 
great objection of Gadamer (1975) to other people’s way of doing hermeneutics is that 
they believe that there is a methodology of interpretation.  The basic methodology 
Gadamer is attacking here is historicism, which he sees as the belief that you can set 
aside preconception, that you can completely factor out your own point of view in order 
to enter into the mindset of some other time or place, into the mind of another (this is 
the object of historicizing).  All you can do, according to Gadamer, is recognize that 
you do exist/live/think consciously within a certain horizon.  As Heidegger (1962), who 
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greatly influenced Gadamer, observed, we cannot help understanding because we 
always already understand, which is not to say that we are right or wrong.   
In 1990, Gadamer gave a lecture at the Universität Heidelberg, entitled Die 
Vielfalt der Sprachen und das Verstehen der Welt (trans. The Multitude of Languages 
and the Understanding of the World).  During that lecture, he said that one has to 
develop one’s own national language in order to say something and perhaps to 
understand others.  As an example, he mentioned that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 
first published in 1781, had to be translated from Latin to German.  The use of the 
vernacular by scholars and the church in medieval times as well as translations of the 
Bible led to the development of national languages. 
Language is only language when it leads to understanding and exchange, which 
Gadamer (1990) refers to as Rede and Gegenrede (also understood as question and 
answer).  The original meaning of the word world in the Germanic and Indo-Germanic 
languages is Menschenwelt, human world.  To understand oneself in the world (sich 
verstehen in der Welt), that is the task brought to us by the multitude of languages 
(Vielfalt der Sprachen), to paraphrase Gadamer.  The world is also a horizon and since 
we live in a pluralistic world, we have multiple horizons.  Gadmer gives a poignant 
example of the pluralistic world when he tells the audience about his encounter with an 
interpreter: in order to be successful, you need to convince and engage in a dialogue 
with the interpreter, as to avoid direct translations; if the interpreter is convinced, the 
interaction between the parties on each side of the interpreter will be more fruitful.  
Hermeneutics was introduced as the art of discovering different levels of 
meaning.  Ricoeur (1974), who has also been influenced by Heidegger, conceived of 
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human beings as linguistic beings, who express themselves in and through language, 
and who manifest their being.  Although he generally subscribed to the notion that self-
understanding can be reached through language, he also acknowledged that language 
has its problems as it is a very complex system.  Some of the differences between 
Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s perspectives regarding understanding should be noted here.  
Taylor (2011) pointed out that even though Ricoeur shared Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
stance in many ways, including aspects of the fusion of horizons, he took it a step 
further by suggesting that understanding should be metaphoric.  Consequently, 
Ricoeur’s notion of understanding “is more of a product of tension between sameness 
and difference, an attempt to find similarity across, and despite, difference” (Taylor, 
2011, p. 114) and stands in contrast to Gadamer’s emphasis on similarity and 
commonality, which are supposed to lead to fused horizons.  Taylor argues that 
Ricoeur’s characterization of understanding as metaphoric seems more realistic and 
“does not require commonality in order for it to succeed” (p. 115).   
When attempting to validate an interpretation in addition to verifying it 
empirically, Ricoeur (1986) asserted that we need to defend it against competing 
interpretations through the process of argumentation.  
If it is true that there is always more than one way of construing a text, it is not 
true that all interpretations are equal.…The text is a limited field of possible 
constructions.  The logic of validation allows us to move between the two limits 
of dogmatism and skepticism.  It is always possible to argue against an 
interpretation, to confront interpretations, to arbitrate between them and to seek 
for an agreement, even if this agreement remains beyond our reach.  (p. 160)   
 
Furthermore, Ricoeur (1974) proposed to relate symbolic language to self-
understanding, defining a symbol as “any structure of signification in which a direct, 
primary, literal meaning designates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, 
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secondary, and figurative and which can be apprehended only through the first” (pp. 12-
13).  Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is inspired by two absolute poles: willingness to suspect 
and willingness to understand.  Both are vital to his philosophy.  Gadamer had the 
willingness to understand, but did not really have the willingness to suspect; Habermas 
has the willingness to suspect, but not so much the willingness to understand. 
Here, it is necessary to briefly discuss the concept of deconstruction as it relates 
to the general discussion of symbols.  Deconstruction is, as a thought process, 
somewhat evasive, whereby one does not quite settle for distinct positions, for an idea 
that can be understood as governed by an umbrella term, referred to by Derrida (1974) 
as a “transcendental signified”, a concept independent of language.  Deconstruction is 
supposed to show that our thinking is not derived from one or another definite concept.  
This is where the idea of the center has an important role as it limits free play, which 
can be seen in an example given by Barthes (1979) when he talks about the experience 
of the Eiffel tower.  In his essay, Barthes wrote “This pure—virtually empty—sign—is 
ineluctable, because it means everything”, and if one wanted to “negate the Eiffel 
Tower…you must…get up on it and, so to speak, identify yourself with it” (p. 4).  It is a 
center that is outside the structure, a center that is not the center (Derrida, 1974); just 
arbitrarily in the middle, organizing everything without participating in the nature of 
anything.   
In a comparison of symbols in semiotic landscapes, the example of the Eiffel 
Tower as a center that is not a center has its parallel in the now non-existent Twin 
Towers.  The Twin Towers have a pathos and poignancy today that did not exist before 
the events of September 11.  Their destruction suggests an ephemerality of the vertical 
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axis since the Twin Towers had a similar function in New York as the Eiffel Tower has 
in Paris; a view of the city with everything organized at its feet.  A similar point 
regarding center and organization was made by Certeau (1984) in his essay about the 
Twin Towers before September 11.  We have the need to make inferences from 
structures, spatial or otherwise, that we also need to acknowledge as tenuous and 
ephemeral.  Lévi-Strauss (1963) admits that his approach to myth is itself only a version 
of the myth; it participates in the mythic way of thinking about things (in Structural 
Anthropology he refers to those as “mythemes” or “gross constituent units” of thought).  
It deploys and manipulates those gross constituent units of thought.  In Raw and the 
Cooked (1969), however, he says that this form of the myth is scientific; the meaning of 
the myth is only discoverable in my science, instead of relying on other available myths.  
Those other myths, such as the Oedpious myth by Freud, Sophocles, etc., have equal 
merit as versions, but none of them is a transcendental signified, a causal explanation or 
meaning of the myth.  He was thus denying the influence of Freud (e.g., it’s my myth, 
not his myth).   
The combinatory structure of speech or writing, such as the binarism of 
relations, is broken down (i.e., signifier and signifier, not signified and signifier).  This 
breakdown then leads to a signifying chain which is not an organizational pattern, but a 
self-replicating and linear self-extending pattern. It is a forward progression or sequence 
of temporal associations since sets of associations take place in time and are not floating 
in space.  Hence the saying that history is just one damn thing after another: it does not 
exist in a systemic space, but it exists in an unfolding time.  Structuralism is a 
problematic critique of genesis.  Derrida (1978) proposed a critique of “structurality”, 
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which is more than just a critique of structuralism.  It is a critique of the idea of 
anything that has a center because a center is an umbrella term, a transcendental 
signified.  As a result, a center is something that explains the nature of the structure, and 
also, according to Derrida, something that allows for limited free play within the 
structure.   
A center is both a center and not a center, according to Derrida (1978).  In other 
words, both that which organizes a structure and that which is not qualified to organize 
anything because it is not in the structure; it is outside the structure, something that 
imposes itself from without on the structure (like a cookie cutter).  Furthermore, the 
world is not anthropocentric, it is linguistic as argued by Cassirer (1944); as a result, 
language supplanted the previous transcendental signified human.  In the absence of a 
center or origin, everything became discourse; language is different because it’s 
perpetually immersed in itself, it is not standing outside of what is going on.  This is the 
critique of structuralism; language is not other than speech, it is perpetually manifest in 
speech.  Language is not quite Saussurean because it is not just a system of signs 
understood as stable relationships between signifieds and signifiers.   
A sign, traditionally understood, is self-sufficient and self-contained.  Saussure 
(1966) made it a scientific object by saying that it is arbitrary and differential.  A sign, 
under the critique of deconstruction, is something that is perpetually proliferating 
signification (i.e., it dies not stand still), leaving “traces” (Derrida, 1978) as successive 
signs are influenced by those signs that precede it (supplementarity is a way of 
understanding that process of verbal expression).  Difference is the Saussurean 
linguistic system, a system of differences, understood as spatial; différance introduces 
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the idea of deferral and reminds us that difference (i.e., our understanding of difference) 
is not something that is done in space, it is done in time.  When I perceive a difference, I 
perceive it temporally; I defer difference as I do not understand the relation among signs 
as a simultaneity. 
There is no nature unless you have culture to think it, which presumes a system 
of signs embedded in language.  Cooked brings raw into being—we cannot know what 
raw is if we do not know what cooked is; raw as opposed to what?  There cannot be 
‘raw’ without the prior existence of cooked, the same way culture brings nature into 
being.  For instance, we cannot experience nostalgia toward something we do not know.  
It is not an inversion of binaries, but a questioning of how they can exist apart from 
each other.  Absolute interdependency of concepts is central to understanding of things; 
Judith Butler (1990; post-deconstruction) talked about the concept of heterosexuality 
that can only exist when we have the concept of homosexuality in place.  Reality is 
there, and the referential function is perpetually in play in language, trying to connect to 
that reality.   
The question thus becomes, if by using language we can know what things 
actually are, and not just that they are.  According to de Man (1986), “what we call 
ideology is precisely the confusion of linguistic with natural reality, of reference with 
phenomenalism” (p. 11).   In other words, ideology is nothing other than the belief that 
language, to be more precise my language, speaks true, which is different from saying 
that what is out there does not exist.  As Derrida (1974) famously put it, “there is 
nothing outside of the text” (p. 158, italics in original).  He was not denying the 
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importance of physical reality, but that there is nothing but text, which means that we 
cannot get outside of the text/reality.   
 In line with the argument regarding the emotional power of symbols and the 
connotational view of the symbolic, Firth’s (1973) definition in his discussion on the 
scope and meaning of symbols proves quite useful here: 
Symbol—where a sign has a complex series of associations, often of emotional 
kind, and difficult (some would say, impossible) to describe in terms other than 
partial representation.  The aspect of personal or social construction in meaning 
may be marked, so no sensory likeness of symbol to object may be apparent to 
an observer, and imputation of relationship may seem arbitrary. (p. 75) 
 
A further perspective on the connotational view of symbolism has been offered by 
Swiss psychologist and psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung, the founder of analytical 
psychology.  He discusses the notion of the collective unconscious and archetypes in 
dream symbolism.  According to Jung (1964), the human mind, or psyche, evolved 
historically just like the human physique did.  
Jung (1964) defines a symbol as “term, a name, or even a picture that may be 
familiar in daily life, yet that possesses specific connotations in addition to its 
conventional and obvious meaning.  It implies something vague, unknown, or hidden 
from us” (p. 20), thus having “a wider ‘unconscious’ aspect that is never precisely 
defined or fully explained.  Nor can one hope to define or explain it.  As the mind 
explores the symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp of reason” (pp. 20-21).  
He argues, that as modern humans have developed a greater consciousness over time, 
they have also become more dissociated from their inner world and the main connection 
and access to the unconscious we have now is through dreams: 
As a general rule, the unconscious aspect of any event is revealed to us in 
dreams, where it appears not as a rational thought but as a symbolic image.  As a 
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matter of history, it was the study of dreams that first enabled psychologists to 
investigate the unconscious aspect of conscious psychic events. (p. 23) 
 
Henderson (1964) describes Jung’s concept of the collective unconscious as “the part of 
the psyche that retains and transmits the common psychological inheritance of 
mankind” while pointing out that those symbols that are expressed in dreams “are so 
ancient and unfamiliar to modern man that he cannot directly understand or assimilate 
them” (p. 107).  As for the concept of archetypes, what Freud called “archaic 
remnants,” Jung defined as “mental forms whose presence cannot be explained by 
anything in the individual’s own life and which seem to be aboriginal, innate and 
inherited shapes of the human mind” (Jung, 1964, p. 67).  Although Jung and Freud 
influenced each other, they eventually diverged due to their different views on the 
unconscious, Jung adding the deeper dimension of the collective unconscious he felt 
was missing from Freud’s notion of collective psychic functioning with the 
unconscious. 
 As mentioned earlier, symbols carry an emotional element with them that is 
primarily responsible for their binding power and for bringing people together, whether 
it is the rallying around a flag, assigning personal values such as freedom to a statue, or 
gathering at a monument to commemorate loss.  Although the author of this study is 
distancing herself form the mysticism route that Jung took in his work, he did provide 
some insightful observations regarding the emotional power of symbols and saw its 
potential in the archetypes:  
We can perceive the specific energy of archetypes when we experience the 
peculiar fascination that accompanies them.  They seem to hold a special 
spell.…archetypes create myths, religions, and philosophies that influence and 
characterize whole nations and epochs of history.  (Jung, 1964, p. 79) 
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He also made note of the affective appeal of symbols used in mythology that is present 
in collective action.  Here is one example: “The energy of archetypes can be focused 
(through rituals and other appeals to mass emotion) to move people to collective action.  
The Nazis knew this, and used versions of Teutonic myths to help rally the country to 
their cause” (Jung, 1964, p. 79).  Furthermore, he was aware of the resilience of 
symbols that presents itself in their enduring power throughout generations of 
civilizations, also referred to as eternal symbols that can be found in different cultures:  
The cultural symbols, on the other hand, are those that have been used to express 
“eternal truths,” and that are still used in many religions.  They have gone 
through many transformations and even a long process of more or less conscious 
development, and have thus become collective images accepted by civilized 
societies.  (Jung, 1964, p. 93) 
 
Thus, the affective dimension as well as the notion of resilience play into the 
phenomenological role of symbols that can motivate social change.  
 Another scholar who delved into the matter of symbolism in society was the 
sociologist Emile Durkheim.  According to Janssen and Verheggen (1997), “Durkheim 
developed the prolegomena for a symbol theory that strikes a balance between the 
spiritual and the material aspects of man and society” (p. 294).  They describe this 
theory as things having meaning because of the collective values they are bearing.  
Janssen and Verheggen elaborate by using an example from Durkheim’s work:  
A flag, as such, is only a piece of cloth from which no emotional meaning can 
be derived.  However, the emotional meaning of the flag can become so 
dramatic that people are willing to sacrifice their life for it.  The flag is the 
bearer of the notion of collectivity; it represents the soul of society and, as such, 
the flag is sacred.  (p. 294)  
 
Emphasizing Durkheim’s rejection of functionalism, and arguing that the “traditional 
outlooks are based on either a one-sidedly cognitivist and/or a one-sidedly relativist 
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interpretation of Durkeim’s symbol theory” (Janssen & Verheggen, 1997, p. 295), they 
assert that Durkheim’s mode of argument and method was of dialectical nature, which 
is not to be confused with Hegel’s dialectics.  One of the examples of his dialectical 
style was his integration of the two constructions regarding the relationship between 
individual and society.  While his work on religion can be read as cognitivist to a 
degree, as well as somewhat relativist regarding culture, “for Durkheim, collective 
representations essentially find their origin in highly emotional—even ecstatic—
collective gatherings” and Durkheim “not only underlined the emotional aspect of the 
symbol, he also emphasized the behavioral aspect. People have to act, and rituals are of 
crucial importance in the formation of social life” (Janssen & Verheggen, 1997, p. 295).  
 In order to balance the reception of Durkheim’s symbol theory, Janssen and 
Verheggen (1997) suggest studying his work through a Schopenhauerian lens.  
Although they do not provide a detailed discussion of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and 
his influence on Durkheim, they point out that 
Schopenhauer proposes a fundamental unity between the principle of living and 
being—the will—and its epistemological counterpart—the representation.  For 
Schopenhauer, the world is will and representation.  In this antagonistic unity, 
the “lower pole” is associated with the will, with matter, instincts, the body, 
emotions, the profane, and nonrationality.  The higher pole, the representation, is 
associated with the mind, reflection, reason, the sacred, and culture in the sense 
of civilization.  (p. 296) 
 
Janssen and Verheggen (1997) state that Durkheim’s aim was the middle road, “so he 
need not postulate that individual and society, body and mind, sociology and 
psychology are mutually exclusive” (p. 299).  They claim that Durkheim was trying to 
find that middle road between two monocausal explanations, also referred to as 
monisms, aiming for an notion of symbols that views the symbol as “an indivisible, 
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dualistic whole” (p. 299).  One of the monisms offers explanations of human behavior 
towards subjects on a material level, the other monism focuses on the spiritual level.  
Thus they infer that, instead of accepting either one-sidedness, Durkheim “seeks to 
develop a symbol theory that steers clear of both extremes.  Symbols are combinations 
of objects and meanings, combinations of inner nature and outwards appearance.  Both 
the object and its meaning are important, but the combination is decisive” (Janssen & 
Verheggen, 1997, p. 299).  
 An important concept in Durkheim’s theoretical writings on society that is 
relevant to this study regarding the contagious social force that is mobilizing 
movements and revolutions is collective effervescence.  Shilling (2005) discusses the 
concept, describing the potential emotional qualities that social assembly and 
interaction can have on people.  Collective effervescence was a term that Durkheim 
used to “capture the idea of social force at its birth, and it is the power of this 
effervescence that allows individuals to be incorporated into the collective moral life of 
the tribe or clan” (Shilling, 2005, p. 215).  Thus, the changes induced in individuals by 
collective effervescence create “emotional capacities” that are “collectively stimulated 
and structured through various rituals that ‘fix’ them to those symbols that are central to 
people’s identity and understanding” (Shilling, 2005, p. 215).  Here the relationship 
between the sacred and the profane comes into play when the emotional component of 
symbols comes to the foreground.  
A crucial observation in Durkheim’s theory of totemism is the transference of 
energy to symbols and how that in turn affects individuals’ sense of identity.  
Consequently, Durkheim (1912/1995, p. 221) notes, “the symbol thus takes the place of 
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the thing, and the emotions aroused are transferred to the symbol.  It is the symbol that 
is loved, feared and respected” (as cited in Shilling, 2005, p. 215).  That transference of 
emotional energy to collective symbols is ultimately giving them meaning, turning them 
into powerful tools to deliver persuasive messages, which is especially useful during 
times of social change.   
 For symbols to work as efficient identifiers of particular groups or nations and to 
evoke a sense of belonging that facilitates social mobilization while creating collective 
effervescence, they need to have an element that is viewed as sacred by the respective 
group or nation.  
The collective effervescence linked with the experience of the sacred is so 
powerful, that Durkheim…argues that there can be no society without a sense of 
the sacred: the sacred energizes the symbolic order of society and motivates 
people to act in relation to the moral norms of that order.  (Shilling, 2005, p. 
221) 
 
When emotionally charged collective symbols stimulate action that becomes contagious 
and evolves into a movement, the direction of the movement can have unpredictable 
consequences.  Shilling (2005) discusses the example of the French Revolution in 1789, 
where the  
general stimulation of energies…produced both sublime and savage moments, 
superhuman heroism and bloody barbarism, as ordinary individuals became 
transformed into new, more extreme beings….Effervescent actions also 
transformed a range of profane phenomena into sacred things which 
strengthened revolutionary society.  Despite the avowedly anti-religious 
character of the Revolution, notions of Fatherland, Liberty and Reason assumed 
a sacred quality.  (p. 222, italics in original) 
 
Shilling (2005) also mentions the example of the soldier and the flag that Janssen and 
Verheggen (1997) discuss in their article, as quoted earlier.  He adds that the notion the 
“effervescent power that has been invested in the flag is such that Durkheim talks of the 
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flag itself sometimes causing action” (p. 222, italics in original).  Once again, the 
emotional energy that is being transferred into a symbol can render it sacred, 
compelling the individual or group to identify themselves with the symbol and act on 
behalf of the collective life of a nation, for instance. 
 Another example of the unpredictable consequences of effervescent action can 
be witnessed in fascist movements.  Shelling (2005) notes that the “essential 
ambivalence of the effervescent actions generated by the sacred is a theme that was 
illustrated by the mass ceremonies, rituals and genocidal destruction characteristic of 
Nazism prior to and during the Second World War” (p. 223).  Although one might have 
some reservations regarding Durkheim’s contribution in light of the possibility of 
disastrous effects that effervescent action could have, as Shilling points out, his work 
continues to be valuable for describing social and cultural change today.  
 A relevant application of Durkheim’s ideas to the present study that Shelling 
(2005) briefly mentions is Tiryakian’s (1995) discussion of social change and collective 
action in the context of the velvet revolutions of 1989.  Tiryakian suggests recombining 
Durkheim’s concept of collective effervescence with Weber’s concept of charisma to 
offer a meaningful interpretation of the dynamics of the historical developments that led 
to the crumbling of the Soviet empire.  
Durkheim and Weber both look at unusual, extraordinary periods for challenges 
to institutionalised authority, and for these challenges to take place, the actors 
involved must transcend the attitudes of everyday life; for Durkheim and Weber 
alike, actors must be capable of acts of heroism born out of enthusiasm.  The 
assembling of the group is background to Weber’s discussion of charismatic 
leadership, and it is foreground to Durkheim. Durkheim’s discussion, without 
using the term, does make room for what we can recognise in Weber as 
charismatic authority.  (Tiryakian, 1995, p. 273) 
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Tiryakian (1995) also talks about the unpredictable nature of social change as well as 
the remarkable speed with which the change occurred in former communist countries of 
Eastern Europe.  He argues that some of that change can be attributed to the contagious 
nature of collective effervescence that helped spread ideas of democratic reform and 
maintained the momentum of protests that kept erupting across the region.  Thus, while 
acknowledging external, exogenous factors, such the new reform leadership of the 
Communist Party, the mass media in the 1980s adding more loopholes to the Soviet 
empire, the economic conditions, the internal decay, and the corruption of the regime, 
he also points out that those are  
not sufficient to account for the revolution.  What played an equally important 
part in this most unexpected social becoming was grass-roots social 
mobilisation, with students and intellectuals playing an important role in what I 
view as movements of national renewal, digging deep into the seemingly buried 
cultural capital to restore or revivify collective symbols that had been though 
laid to rest by the communist regimes.  Social mobilisation , the coming together 
of persons in public places, had been, of course, used by fascist and communist 
regimes, but the social mobilisation seen in 1988-91 was on a voluntary basis, 
very much in keeping with Durkheim’s discussion of the social assembly.  (p. 
276) 
 
Dimensional Accrual of Dissociation Theory 
Given the primary focus on the emotional aspect of national symbols and their 
presence in myths of origin, the theory of dimensional accrual and dissociation (DAD) 
is useful for discussing the sources of the affective power of symbols.  According to 
Kramer (2012), the “theory of dimensional accrual and dissociation synthesizes two 
powerful ideas; dissociation and consciousness structuration.  The result is a new 
understanding of culture as a form of expression” (p. 124).  Through a synthesis of the 
work of Jean Gebser and Lewis Mumford and an interpretation of “consciousness 
structure as communicative phenomenon, the theory of dimensional accrual and 
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dissociation (DAD) offers a solid approach to understanding cultures and intercultural 
misunderstandings” (p. 137).   
Kramer (2012) describes the different dimensions as types of worlds, which are 
based on Geber’s (1985) structures of conciousness.  The full spectrum of worlds in the 
DAD theory includes the archaic world, the magic idolic world, the mythic symbolic 
world, the perspectival signalic world, and the aperspectival world.  For the purposes of 
this study, the magic, mythic, and perspectival dimensions will be primarily discussed, 
as they are well suited to serve as an analytical guide for answering the questions asked 
here.  In order to be able to discern some of the patterns that can explain the emotional 
power of national symbols and how that power of symbols motivates members of a 
nation to mobilize when their freedoms are compromised, one has to acknowledge and 
understand the differences in consciousness structures as they inform actions and 
communication.  
 Although elements of the different worlds can be present in groups and 
individuals at times, there is a “tendency to manifestly express predominantly one or 
another structure” (Kramer, 2012, p. 143).  Kramer emphasizes that none of the 
worldviews is superior to the other; the progression from one dimension to the next 
does not presume the concept of progress as evolution.  Instead, it suggests that one 
structure might be more efficient than another, depending on the need.  Thus, if a 
collective, national or otherwise, needs to find a way to ensure cohesion and mobilize 
its members to join a common cause, the more efficient way to communicate would be 
through an appeal to emotion instead of rational reason.   
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The magic worldview is spaceless and timeless, as well as one-dimensional and 
pre-perspectival. This worldview  
exhibits and idolic incantatory mode of communication that is identically 
univalent.  This means that, to the magic person, the statue of god is god.  This 
piece of wood is literally a piece of the actual cross on which Christ was 
crucified.  (Kramer, 2012, p. 145, italics in original) 
 
Cultural and religious groups often times co-opt and resanctify sacred traditions from 
other faiths according to their own beliefs.  Christianity has done that with many of its 
traditions and symbols, such as turning the originally pagan holiday of winter solstice 
into a celebration of Christmas, which includes a Christmas tree, also a former pagan 
symbol.  In the magic worldview, harmony and stability is preferred at the expense of 
change.  The one-dimensional structure bestows magic objects with great power to 
influence people through their emotional qualities.  Thus, if a seemingly rational person 
witnesses a parade displaying national symbols, such as flags and the signing of an 
anthem, they might be involuntarily moved because those symbols speak to their sense 
of belonging to a group.  They feel (which is where the magic takes over and rationality 
goes out the window) the connection, amor patriae, evoked by what they know as a 
magic sign.  And they know that sign because it is a part of the system of symbols, a 
recognizable code.  Kramer (2012) wrote, “magic objects embody what modern 
philosophers in their way call absolute logocentrism.  Nations that built the most 
powerful military technologies of their times, such as V-2 Rockets and massive 
battleships, were inspired and infused with magic and myth” and denying “the 
continued efficacy of magic and myth is to underestimate their power and to possibly 
fall under the spell” (p. 147).  This is an example of the potential danger of the 
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emotional power of nationalism; when feelings of patriotism turn into the spell of 
nationalism the consequences can be dire.  
The mythic worldview is proto-spatial and cyclically temporal, as well as two-
dimensional and unperspectival.  This worldview “manifests a symbolic mode of 
communication that exhibits bivalent am-bi-guity between figural and literal meaning 
and a semi-linear proto-spatial narrative form” (Kramer, 2012, p. 152).  Here the a 
separation of meanings into figural and literal makes interpretation possible, polarity 
begins to emerge in mythic symbolism, not to be confused with duality as expressed 
through binary oppositions.  The fragmentation into signified and signifier is not yet 
complete in the mythic consciousness, but it is decidedly moving in that direction.  
Here, again, Christianity efficiently uses the mythic structure, where “wine symbolizes 
the blood of Christ.  A crucifix is semi-sacred, neither identical with God not totally 
arbitrary in form or intent/motive” (p.153).  The polarity of the sacred and the profane, 
as well as the metaphors of light and dark, are crucial components in the creation of 
myths, which plays an important role for the analysis of national symbols in this study, 
as evidenced in the discussion section.  It also helps explain why the binding power of 
religion “fragments into sectarian violence and wars of ideology, not simply of plunder 
and the acquisition of tribute, commence” (p. 155).  
The perspectival worldview is spatial and abstractly temporal, as well as three-
dimensional and perspectival.  This worldview “manifests a signalic mode of 
communication exhibiting trivalent arbitrary meaning” and is “predominant in the 
cultural modality known as modernity” (Kramer, 2012, p. 159).  The fragmentation into 
signified and signifier is now complete and meaning is assigned arbitrarily and is 
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conventional.  This fragmentation opens the way to conflicts of interpretations, resulting 
in cultural wars between competing ideologies.  In the perspectival consciousness 
structure, meaning is decided through the interactive process of binary oppositions, if 
there is a meaning at all.  Another potential ramification of the claim to a completely 
arbitrary relationship between signified and signifier is relativism, which leads to 
uncertainty and instability in the modern world.  The “modern hope” to fix this problem 
and avoid the consequences of relativism has been problematic due to the “dissociation 
of meaning from expression, intent form act, for the perspectival person, there no longer 
exists a sense that the body of the expression and its mind or meaning have anything in 
common” (p. 160).  The consciousness structures are on a continuum, as dimensions 
accrue, dissociation increases.    
 For a hermeneutics of national symbols, the three consciousness structures 
discussed above supplement the semiotic principles that are jointly applied throughout 
the analysis.  In order to analyze national symbols we need a better understanding of the 
bigger picture, which necessarily includes the idea of the nation and nationalism to 
further contextualize the unit of analysis.  The next section is an overview of 
nationalism theories and the differences between the more prominent nationalism 
scholars who represent different schools of thought. 
Nationalism: An Overview 
When it comes to offering a definition of nationalism, the task is quite daunting, 
and as usual, it depends on whom you ask to formulate that definition.  Goldmann, 
Hannerz, and Westin (2000) argue that “political philosophers with normative 
preoccupations may strive towards impeccable formulations of nationalism or 
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internationalism” (p. 2) whereas “many anthropologists, sociologists and members of 
some other disciplines” are “perhaps more ready to accept that in their everyday forms, 
nationalisms and internationalisms may be fragmented, situationally shifting, and 
internally inconsistent” (p. 3).  Some of the problems when trying to define nationalism 
stem from the tendency to focus on the state more than on the masses, which takes away 
from the emotional appeal of nationalism and turns it mostly into a civic debate, 
downplaying or ignoring the persistence and “enduring power” of ethnonationalism 
(Muller, 2008).  As Muller observes,  
the conventional narrative of European history asserts that nationalism was 
primarily liberal in the western part of the continent and that it became more 
ethnically oriented as one moved east.  There is some truth to this, but it 
disguises a good deal as well.…Liberal nationalism, that is, was most apt to 
emerge in states that already possessed a high degree of ethnic homogeneity.  
Long before the nineteenth century, countries such as England, France, Portugal, 
Spain, and Sweden emerged as nation-states in polities where ethnic divisions 
had been softened by a long history of cultural and social homogenization.”  (pp. 
2-3) 
  
The nation as a modern social form has been undergoing a transformation, rather than 
disappearing.  In the nineties, some scholars suggested that the nation-state was being 
replaced by a new global order (Appadurai, 1997; Bauman, 1998), but more recent 
research, which focused on national and transnational media systems, has revealed that 
the nation-state is in a fact a much more resilient social form across the world (Curran 
& Park, 2000).  Calhoun (1997) presents one of the more insightful perspectives on 
nationalism, describing it as a continuous discursive process that is always being 
expressed and contested. 
In the Oxford Reader on nationalism, Hutchinson and Smith (1994) ask the 
crucial questions: “Can we envisage a world without nations or nationalism?  To what 
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extent has the concept of national identity been transformed in a global era?” (p. 287).  
In order to be able to answer this question, the definitions in the existing literature on 
nationalism are examined and compared across various disciplines. 
According to Smith’s (1991) perspective on national identity, nations and 
nationalism, have to be treated as cultural phenomena in order to be understood, not just 
in ideological or political form, “That is to say, nationalism, the ideology and 
movement, must be closely related to national identity, a multidimensional concept, and 
extended to include a specific language, sentiments, and symbolism” (p. vii, italics in 
original).  In his outline of the elements of national identity, Smith defines a nation as 
“a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical 
memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and 
duties for all members” (p. 14, italics in original).  He acknowledges that there are a lot 
of disputes when it comes to define what a nation is and no single one definition is 
unproblematic.  That also explains why scholars of nationalism do not have a unified 
understanding where nationalism starts and what its boundaries are.  Most of them agree 
however that nationalism is a very current issue still:  
The age of globalization is also the age of nationalist resurgence, expressed both 
in the challenge to established nation-states and in the widespread 
(re)construction of identity on the basis of nationality, always affirmed against 
the alien.  This historical trend has surprised some observers, after nationalism 
has been declared deceased by a triple death: the globalization of the economy 
and the internationalization of political institutions; the universalism of a largely 
shared culture, diffused by electronic media, education, literacy, urbanization, 
and modernization; and the scholarly assault on the very concept of nations.  
(Castells, 2004, p. 30)  
 
Castells (2004) presents his definition of nations in what he calls the information age as 
“cultural communes constructed in people’s minds and collective memory by the 
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sharing of history and political projects” (p. 54, italics in original).  His approach to 
nationalism and national identity is quite different from that of Gellner (1983), 
Hobsbawm (1992), and Anderson (2006).  Both, Gellner and Hobsbawm outlined the 
historical events that were crucial in the formation of nation-states with nationalistic 
patterns to follow, and both envisioned the ideal development as a construction of a 
modern, sovereign nation-state.  Gellner’s view of the “high cultures” of the elite versus 
the “low cultures” of the majority of the population has been criticized by Smith (2001), 
Edensor (2002), Castells (2004), and others, not surprisingly so, given that for Gellner 
(1983), “nationalisms are simply those tribalisms, or for that matter any kind of groups, 
which through luck, effort or circumstance succeed in becoming an effective force 
under modern circumstances” (p. 87).   
Hobsbawm’s (1992) account of nationalism is problematic because he sees the 
“masses” as being coerced through the ideological messages from the culture industries 
that are reinventing and restaging traditions to sustain cultural, and thus national 
identity.  Those traditions, according to Edensor (2002), should be seen as much more 
flexible since they are not fixed, and instead of trying to emulate those traditional 
cultural spectacles as closely to the historic original as possible, they should be 
reconstructed and connected to the current times.  Hobsbawm (1992) distinguishes 
himself from Gellner by opposing his notion of “high cultures” as the only origin of 
nationalism, however, according to Castells (2004), “against Hobsbawm’s and 
Anderson’s views, nationalism as a source of identity cannot be reduced to a particular 
historical period and to the exclusive workings of the modern nation-state” (p. 34).  
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Hutchinson and Smith (1994), who disagree with Gellner and Hobsbawm 
observe a contestation of the concept of the nation on two fronts, one being “rival 
scholarly definitions” and the other being a type of identity competing with other 
collective identities.  They contend that  
while is its recognized that the concept of the nation must be differentiated from 
other concepts of collective identity like class, region, gender, race, and 
religious community, there is little agreement about the role of ethnic, as 
opposed to political, components of the nation; or about the balance between 
‘subjective’ elements like will and memory, and more ‘objective’ elements like 
territory and language; or about the nature and role of ethnicity in national 
identity.  (p. 4) 
 
Their claim does not stand in opposition to Castells’ (2004) work.  In fact, Castells is 
quite supportive of Smith’s theoretical manifestations on the question of nationalism 
and national identity, who in his later work argued that nationalism can go beyond 
nations, a rather congruent standpoint with that presented by Castells and his theory of 
the ever-expanding network society. 
Theories and Theorists of Nationalism 
Gellner’s (1983) approach to nationalism has been classified as modernist, or 
instrumentalist to a certain extent.  According to Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism, the 
phenomenon of nationalism is a product of the modern society, which developed 
throughout the process of industrialization.  He claims that pre-modern, agrarian 
societies did not have the necessary conditions for nationalism to emerge.  Thus, 
nationalism underwent the transition from agrarian to industrial/modern, society.  The 
“age of transition to industrialism” is linked, in Gellner’s view, to the “age of 
nationalism” (p. 40) and was naturally accompanied by violence and conflict as a 
response to the drastic changes of the new development.  The new division of labor that 
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was brought by modernization and the notion of progress led to a different kind of 
specialization and high mobility.  
One of the most striking results of the modernized division of labor in industrial 
society was the change in the educational system, which became the least specialized 
that has existed so far, in contrast to the degree of specialization in most other areas.  
Gellner notes, “a man’s education is by far his most precious investment, and in effect 
confers his identity on him” (p. 36).  He goes even further to portray state and culture as 
inseparable for one’s production and re-production (possible thanks to standardization): 
“The imperative of exo-socialization is the main clue to why state and culture must now 
be linked….Now it is unavoidable.  That is what nationalism is about, and why we live 
in an age of nationalism” (p. 38, italics in original). 
 In his discussion of typology of nationalisms, Gellner (1983) describes the core 
element of nationalism as being  
about entry to, participation in, identification with, a high literate culture which 
is co-extensive with an entire political unit and its total population, and which 
must be of this kind if it is to be compatible with the kind of division of labor, 
the type or more of production, on which this society is based.  (p. 95) 
He posits that the essence of nationalism is the close relationship between state and 
culture, nationalism consisting of three major factors: “power, education, and shared 
culture” (p. 97).  Gellner’s state-centered approach of nationalism with its dependence 
on his concept of “high-culture” renders it as distinctively modern, dismissing the 
possibility of prior ethnicity as the origin of nationalism, and claiming that “it is 
nationalism which engenders nations and not the other way round” (p. 55).  This 
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approach is problematic because it cannot explain the affective power of national 
identity, it underestimates changes in cultural patterns that existed prior to nationalism, 
leading towards it, and it seems to ignore ethnic identities or treat them as given.  
 Most nationalism scholars of the twentieth century, such as Kohn, Seton-
Watson, Kedourie, and others, claim that nationalism cannot be explained by pre-
existing ethnicity.  In Gellner’s (1983) view, ethnicity is not a sufficient explanation for 
the emergence of nationalism, which he bases on his presentation of specific cases of 
failed or absent nationalisms.  This point can also be seen in his view concerning 
culture, which he regards as important but not constitutive.  Here, again, he is arguing 
against tradition and culture—both being linked to ethnicity—as not having sufficient 
explanatory power.  
Culture becomes powerful when it transitions into “high culture” that leads to 
homogenization and standardization of society.  Hence culture in the industrial society 
became an organizing principle: new division of labor, education, advanced 
communications systems, mobility, etc.  This principle is crucial to the resulting 
homogenized culture necessary for the foundation of nationalism.  But how does this 
process of creating or constructing a new cultural identity work?  The transition into this 
new identity in more concrete contexts is barely explained and needs further exploration 
and analysis.  He also mentions that national identity can feel “ardently” yet he does not 
enlighten us how exactly such functional necessities can actually lead to the powerful 
emotions caused by identification.  
Smith’s (1988) ethnosymbolist approach to nationalism stands in contrast to 
Gellner’s (1983).  Smith sees the origin of nations in a pre-modern context, his 
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ethnosymbolist perspective being a synthesis of the modern and the traditional.  
According to Smith, nations have “ethnic cores” and remain an entity through 
solidarity, a bond they perceive to exist with the nation as well as the individual 
members of the nation.  He describes those ethnic cores as ethnie, or ethnic 
communities that he defines as “named human populations with shared ancestry myths, 
histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of 
solidarity” (p. 32).  Thus, nationalist sentiment can emerge through the local 
prevalent/dominant ideology.  
Smith (1988) rejects the notion that nations are a recent development emerging 
from industrialism, as Gellner (1983) would argue, instead, he sees them as pre-modern 
with ethnic foundations.  He pointedly states that religious factors are “the pivotal 
elements in crystallizing and maintaining ethnic identity” (p. 124).  Smith does not 
fundamentally disagree that nationalism as a philosophy is emerging during the time of 
the industrialization process in the late eighteenth century, however, he insists that 
nations as socially and politically organized units do not have a modern origin.  He also 
distances himself from purely primordialist approaches that claim the givennness and 
natural character of nations.  Smith acknowledges both, primordialist and modernist 
theoretical strands, positioning himself in between and adopting a perennialist outlook.  
In other words, he steers between modernism and instrumentalism, and between 
primordialism and perennialism.  According to Smith, modernity transformed human 
loyalties and the “triple transformations” led to types of nationalism that emerged.  
But what exactly are ethnies?  Are they agents or structures?  Are they 
institutions or identities?  Do they impose or encourage interest in maximized behavior?  
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Smith (1988) delineates two basic kinds of ethnies that are equally important: vertical 
and lateral.  The vertical (demotic) ethnies span across social strata and is ephemeral, it 
can be very intense but fades quicker and is less stable.  The lateral (aristocratic) 
ethnies, spread more broadly, but structures do not penetrate deeply.  Smith argues that 
the vertical ethnies, including the vast majority, have to become more exclusive, and 
what he calls “messianic” (borrowing from Walter Benjamin’s Illuminations—
“Messianic Time”), and the vertical ethnies have to become more exclusive, 
enfranchising.  The question is then, does ethnic identity have coercive emotional 
power?  Primordialists have been criticized for basing their claims of the emotional 
course of power, but denying the emotional power does not provide the answer either.  
Modernists, on the other hand, have been criticized for assuming that power creates 
analytical problems.  Thus, Smith attempts to offer the middle ground, suggesting that 
mythic structures persist.  
One of Smith’s (1988) main strengths is his excellent command of historical 
contextualization.  He makes a very compelling case for his argument of the pre-
modern/ancient existence of ethnic states by presenting a wide array of historical 
evidence (though this kind of evidence is not always unproblematic) for this existence.  
Another strong point in Smith’s work is his attempt at explaining the affective force of 
nationalist sentiment through his concept of mythomoteur that refers to the powerful 
meanings of symbols and myths that make ethnies so pervasive and persistent.  He does 
not claim ethnicity to be natural instead of being socially constructed but he argues that 
ethnicity is only very slow to alter. Smith argues that there is a possibility to trace a 
“genealogy of nations” where ethnies become nations, which can be accounted for 
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through the introduction of cultural and social structural variables.  The potential for 
political mobilization is tied to this cultural transformation of ethnie members into 
citizens (the “triple Western revolution”).  However, emphasizing almost exclusively 
the symbolic and affective dimension of ethnicity might prove problematic as well as 
claiming the continuity of ethnic groups.  Could it be that ethnicity is perhaps a product 
of manipulation, a creation of the elites?  That is a conceptual question that Smith does 
not address and that can be used as a counter-argument, which is not my intent here, but 
it definitely offers ground for debate.  
Anderson’s (1983/2006) concept of nationalism is categorized as a constructivist 
approach.  He defines the nation as an imagined political community due to its inherent 
limitedness and sovereignty.  Accordingly, Anderson sees that political community as 
imagined  “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion” (p. 6).  In other words, he describes nations as 
imagined, as opposed to actual communities, because the affinity to other community 
members (co-nationals) is mainly possible through the mental image of the affinity.  
Anderson’s (1983) explanation of how nationalism comes into being is through 
change in social consciousness, in contradistinction to changes in social structure, as 
proposed by Gellner (1983), and to Smith (1988) who defines elements of continuity 
(triple transformation).  The strength in Anderson’s approach is that it bridges the gap 
since it is linked to changes in political consciousness as well.  Another strength of the 
constructivist approach as employed by Anderson is that it is more useful for evaluating 
identities than the modernist or instrumentalist approach, for instance.  Following 
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constructivism, identities can be manipulated (i.e., constructed) and affect is accepted as 
a necessary compound of identity.  Anderson’s weakness becomes apparent when he 
conflates national consciousness with nationalism, which is more problematic when he 
talks about Europe, though he does better in his discussion of the colonies.  He sees 
nations and nationalism as creations of modernity that are means to political and 
economic ends, and imagined communities being a form of social constructivism.  In 
contrast to Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm (1992), he values the idealistic/utopian 
element in nationalism, and he does not see nationalism as obsolescent in the 
globalizing world.  Another contrast to Gellner and many other nationalism theorists is 
Anderson’s claim that the European nation-state came into being as the response to 
nationalism in the European Diaspora beyond the ocean, in colonies (in both Americas).  
He sees nation-state building as an “imitative” action.  
Although Gellner and Anderson can both be classified as modernist, they differ 
substantially on social consciousness.  Anderson’s use of constructivism is useful 
regarding social consciousness because this perspective is pointing out contingencies, 
unintended consequences that arise from systems of identifications and 
categorizations—with the result of identity.  Of course, one of the limitations of 
constructivism, which is also one of the constructivists’ contempt, is the messiness of 
the approach.  The frequent usage of the concept of identity to explain almost every 
major social phenomenon becomes axiomatic and leads to the objectification of a 
subjective concept, given that, in order to talk about identity, we have to treat it 
objectively.  The alternative to this objectification of identity, is deconstruction, a 
concept from postmodernist philosophy.  Another alternative would be to stop using the 
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term identity and aggregate the concept instead.  What is often times problematic with 
all the concepts discussed here, such as the nation, is that those are categories of 
practice and analysis.  Thus, primordial forces do exist, but that does not mean that 
primordialism is the explanation, which is why constructivists often make recourse to 
instrumentalism and primordialism.  
Hechter’s (2001) approach to nationalism is quite distinct from some of the 
previous works, including Gellner, Smith, and Anderson.  He does mention the onset of 
industrialization and modernity as crucial to the emergence of nationalism, but he 
deems those processes as insufficient explanations for the emergence of nationalism.  
Instead, he focuses more on the effects of direct vs. indirect rule on group solidarity, 
taking an instrumentalist perspective.  According to Hechter (2001), “the greater the 
proportion of each member’s resources contributed to the group’s ends, the greater the 
group’s solidarity” (p. 21).  Due to group solidarity, group members contribute their 
resources to comprise the joint good, on a larger scale, the nation: “Thus the articulation 
and promotion of culturally distinctive institutions is the joint good that lies at the core 
of nation-formation” (p. 23, italics in original).  However, in order to prevent free riders 
from having access to the joint good, social controls are established that in turn create 
social boundaries, and those eventually extend to physical boundaries (i.e., 
territoriality).  One of Hechter’s main arguments is that it was the enactment of the 
direct rule that gave rise to nationalism.  He points out that through direct rule, as 
opposed to indirect rule, the dependence on the centre is stronger and the demand for 
self-determination becomes an issue.  Hechter proposes that, “if nationalism is 
collective action designed to make the boundaries of the nation and the governance unit 
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congruent, then it can only emerge when there is a disjuncture between the boundaries 
of the nation and those of the governance unit” (p. 36).   
 Hechter’s (2001) argument is strong in the pragmatic sense due to his attempt at 
proposing actual policies instead of just theorizing and staying in the philosophical 
realm of the issue at hand.  However, the practical implications of the hypotheses 
posited in his work get lost at times because Hechter does not demonstrate their 
testability, or even the intent to test his claims.  Another weakness to be observed in 
Hechter’s theory is generally a problem in the instrumentalist approach to nationalism: 
(1) the primary focus is elites; (2) explaining nationalist violence becomes a challenge.  
The latter challenge can be overcome, or at least aided, by acknowledging some of the 
explanatory power of the primordialist approach.  Although it would not be wise to 
solely rely on primordialism as a complete explanation for nationalism as previously 
mentioned, the aspect of affect in nationalist movements that makes them so powerful is 
better accounted for in primordialist explanations, thus instrumentalists could benefit by 
implementing some of those explanations instead of just reacting to them and deeming 
them obsolete.  However, instrumentalism is not alone with this problem, the modernist 
and institutionalist schools of thought are facing similar limitations.  
 The instrumentalist approach, a reaction to primordialism, sees ethnic groups as 
defined by boundaries rather than content, thus accounting for the movement of ethnic 
boundaries, which in turn allows for changes of identity.  The two core aspects of 
instrumentalism are distribution and domination.  Politics is a distributive game, a zero-
sum relationship where one’s gain is another one’s loss.  The aspect of domination 
refers to the decision of who actually does the distributing.  So, what are the 
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implications?  Instrumentalists would argue that identity is situational, a matter of 
choice, and does not exist without the political dimension.  If identity is relative and 
positional, why is it so powerful?  This goes back to the problems and challenges of 
instrumentalism mentioned earlier and is one of its weaknesses when it comes to 
address the affective power of identity that can results in nationalist violence.  
 In Hechter’s (2001) discussion of the cultural division of labor the question 
arises, what is the difference between national identity and social class?  Hechter’s 
response would be that nationality is not class because nations are already there.  He 
also claims that it is a good idea to devolve power because there would be fewer 
opportunities to mobilize.  In that case, how do we contain nationalism without enticing 
it?  Again, this is a challenge to Hechter’s instrumentalist argument.   
Brubaker (1996) proposes a triadic relationship for the phenomenon of 
nationalism: (1) “nationalizing” nationalisms; (2) homeland nationalisms; and (3) 
national minorities.  He mainly bases his analysis on the case of post-communist 
nationalisms in contemporary Eastern Europe, comparing those with the nationalisms of 
the interwar period.  Both nationalisms emerged after the breakup of multinational 
states into would-be nation-states.  Brubaker emphasizes that “nations,” or what he 
refers to as nationhood and nation-ness, are categories of practice, sometimes 
incorrectly conflated into categories of analysis.  Thus he advocates the practical uses of 
the category “nation.”  What seems new to Brubaker’s categorization is his description 
of the independence and mutual antagonism between the elements of the relational 
nexus mentioned above, creating tensions that are in turn exploited by elites and counter 
elites.  Also different in his approach is his view on nationhood as an institutionalized 
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form, and nation-ness as event as opposed to development, a view held by Gellner, 
Anderson, Smith, and Hobsbawm, according to Brubaker. 
Brubaker’s (1996) emphasis on contingency shows a weak point because he 
does not address the institutional origins, he just says that it does happen.  So what does 
the institutionalist approach predict?  Does the institutionalization of identity lead to 
collapse (Brubaker’s example of internal passports during the Soviet regime)?  Or is it 
the actual institutional structure?  Brubaker shows how relational fields can exacerbate 
institutions and that there can be variation, i.e., stances that are adopted can vary.  What 
is the interrelationship between stances then?  One example is what Brubaker calls the 
“homeland nationalism” in Russia.  This notion of homeland nationalism seems to be an 
ad hoc explanation and poses an empirical problem.  Why didn’t it work?  Because 
there was no demand.  What historical and sociological institutionalists miss is that 
power is emphasized in the creation of institutions.  Sociological institutionalists, such 
as Brubaker, do not provide an explanation where that power comes from.  This is also 
a shortcoming regarding the power of affect in identity.  
Billig’s (1995) approach moves away from the tendencies to develop macro-
theories that many of the other theorists have attempted.  Instead, Billig focuses on the 
everyday display of nationalism, primarily in the West. 
To stretch the term ‘nationalism’ indiscriminately would invite confusion: 
surely, there is a distinction between the flag waved by Serbian ethnic cleansers 
and that hanging unobtrusively outside the US post office; or between the policy 
of the Front National and the support given by the leader of the opposition to the 
British government’s Falkland’s policy.  For this reason, the term banal 
nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits which enable the 
established nations of the West to be reproduced.  It is argued that these habits 
are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed.  Daily, 
the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry.  Nationalism, far 
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form being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic 
condition.  (p. 6) 
 
He emphasizes that banal does not mean benign at all and he warns of the danger of the 
seemingly subtle display of national symbols, such as the ubiquitous presence of flags, 
in everyday life.  Those symbols serve as reminders and are “flagging” nationhood 
unflaggingly, to put it into Billig’s (1995) terms (p. 41).  He remarks that the flagging is 
occurring routinely and does not require a conscious activity, thus differing from 
consciously orchestrated commemorative events.   
Billig (1995) also points to the distinction between “hot” and banal nationalism, 
referring to the seemingly conventional view that nationalism only occurs when there is 
a social disruption, a crisis, or any other extreme situation that appears to threaten a 
nation-state and is evoking a passionate response, thus making it hot.  He warns that 
nationalism never entirely disappears, even during times of no crisis. The continuous 
“flagging” of national symbols keeps the potentially nationalist spirit alive, 
“unflaggingly”, which, in turn, ensures readiness and responsiveness of citizens in case 
of a national threat or conflict.   
 A criticism of Billig’s (1995) account has been directed toward the way he fails 
to adequately address the complexity of “national life” in Britain, one of his major 
examples of banal nationalism in the West.  As Skey (2009) points out,  
as theorists, we cannot assume that particular representations of the nation are 
resonant or relevant for all (and at all times) who happen to live within a 
particular political theory, just because they are associated with powerful 
institutional actors or agencies.  (p. 342) 
 
However, Billig (1995) quite accurately observes the persistence of the nation-state and 
universal ideology of nationalism, acknowledging the success of the nation-state, 
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regardless of its origin.  He refers to nationhood as the “universal form of sovereignty” 
and compares it to examples of territorial limitations of such ideologies as liberalism, 
Marxism, Christendom, and Islam, which pale in comparison to the international 
ideology of nationalism.  He further states that the “nation-state abhors a territorial 
vacuum” and “the boundary-consciousness of nationalism has itself known no 
boundaries in its historical triumph” (p. 22), respectively.  This international presence of 
the ideology of nationalism and the success throughout its history is yet another reason 
why the study of the communicative role of national symbols is pertinent to the field of 
international communication.  And while several of the nationalism theorists discussed 
here have made useful contributions to the study of nationalism, the ethno-symbolist 
approach as presented by Smith and the idea of banal nationalism as proposed by Billig 
have been chosen as the framework for the analysis of national symbols in this study.   
Billig (1995) and Smith (2009) offer complimentary perspectives; as Billig 
concentrates on the seemingly ordinary everyday experience of nationalism through 
mindless reminders of nationhood, Smith examines the more emotionally charged 
ideological roots and motivations of nationalism based in ethno-symbolism.  Since the 
selection of national symbols for this analysis includes symbols that are, both, displayed 
routinely and rooted in everyday life, as well as evoked during times of mobilization 
challenging the status quo, those two approaches prove useful.  
In order to paint a fuller picture of the role national symbols played in Poland 
during the Soviet regime as well as during its demise, it is useful to expand on the 
intertwining ideological forces of nationalism and communism.  Both showcased 
symbolic expressions of solidarity for their respective cause, with unintended 
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consequences at times that mostly played to the disadvantage of the Communist Party.  
The following section offers some examples. 
Symbolic Representations of Nationalism and Communism 
One of the bigger problems contributing to the fall of communism was the 
connection between communism and nationalism, which is a modernist notion built into 
the Soviet regime.  Brown (2009) justly observes this notion, namely that “the 
Communist state, both by promoting the spread of education and by embedding national 
structures in its institutional framework from the 1922 constitution onwards, had sown 
the first seeds of its ultimate destruction” (p. 60).  This also seems to diverge from 
Lenin’s misguided vision of a stateless society, although he was closer to the 
internationalization of communism than some of his followers, most notably Stalin.  
While the Communist Party was trying to “colonize” the past it had to rely on the trend 
in Polish history to see Germany as its main threat (the other trend posed the East as its 
main enemy), leading to the diminishing power of communist slogans.  As a 
consequence, the Party relied more on nationalist rhetoric, which  “could not be taken to 
its logical conclusion because then the dominant position of the Soviet Union would be 
called into question” (Koczanowicz, 2008, p. 80). 
An example of the persistence of national and cultural identity in the case of 
Poland could be seen in the preservation of most national symbols during the 
communist rule.  Kubik (1994) offers an insightful description and analysis of the 
meaning of symbols during the period 1976-81, including earlier and later events when 
pertinent.  He investigates the relationship of the Solidarity culture with its political 
power, focusing “on the emergence, character, and social functions of the 
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symbolic/discursive polarization between the Party-state and the populace, as it was 
reflected in public ceremonies, demonstrations, and spectacles” (p. 5).  As Kubik points 
out, the quest for legitimacy of the Communist regime was problematic due to an 
inherent constraint in its very nature:  
Any regime must preserve its identity and adhere to its fundamental 
organizational principles if its survival in power is to have any meaning.  A 
Communist regime, therefore, cannot construct its legitimacy by invoking 
electoral democracy or political pluralism without doing itself in” (p. 2, italics in 
original).  
 
Thus, Polish Communists chose to partially remodel the national culture as a strategy to 
create their necessary legitimacy.  The other solutions, to either impose “a totally new 
culture and the socialization of the populace to accept it” or to accept, or “appearing to 
accept, the existing (political) culture of the country” (Kubik, 1994, p. 3) were not 
feasible.  The strategy to impose a completely new culture has been pursued 
unsuccessfully by other Eastern European states, and creating the impression of 
accepting the existing culture has not been pursued since it would have potentially lead 
to the regime’s collapse.  The chosen solution to partially remodel the national culture 
was supposed to mean “socialist in form and national in content” (p. 3), but it became 
much more national overall than desired by the regime.  Although neither the system 
nor the regime did foresee this consequence at the time, the notion of communism and 
nationalism functioning simultaneously has been pointed out by some scholars since 
then.   
According to Mevius (2009), one of the views concerning the relationship 
between communism and nationalism has been presented as antagonistic and mutually 
exclusive.  Additionally, nationalism has supposedly been oppressed prior to 1989 only 
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to come to light following the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Mevius notes that these are 
popular myths and that  
reality was different.…The use of national images was not the exception, but the 
rule.  From Cuba to Korea, all communist parties attempted to gain national 
legitimacy.  This was not incidental or a deviation from Marxist orthodoxy, but 
ingrained in the theory and practice of the communist movement since its 
inception.  (p. 377) 
 
The protagonists themselves have perpetrated these myths.  For the nationalists, the 
communists were not patriotic or “national” enough, given their ties to Moscow.  The 
communists rejected that notion, but more importantly they insisted that communism is 
completely separate from nationalism, thus supporting the myth of polar opposites.  
Mevius (2009) claims that the alleged blind spots in literature regarding the 
relationship between communism and nationalism can be attributed to “the intense 
fragmentation of the field in terms of chronological and geographical context and of 
subject matter” due to studies being limited to “specific countries and time periods.”  
Thus, “the comprehensive nature of communist appeals to national legitimacy remains 
hidden, and communist appeals to nationalism appear as novelty” (p. 381).  He sees the 
fragmentation as a problem in general for other disciplines, but particularly when 
applied to communism.  “This was a movement that existed continuously from 1848 to 
1989, was international in organization and outlook, and from 1918 was dominated by 
the Comintern and the Soviet Union” (p. 391).  Mevius expresses concern about this 
contextual blind spot regarding the communist ideology trying to reconcile with 
nationalism, but he’s hopeful that the new literature is presenting a trend in 
historiography that might prove redeeming in the future.  This relationship between 
communism and nationalism was a necessary strategy for the preservation of legitimacy 
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of the communist regime.  Reinforcing the image of unity through the appeal of 
belonging to a nation was crucial for the maintenance of the status quo and preventing 
social unrest due to a perceived lack of collective identity.   
Although the regime “relied mostly on the tactic of gradually remodeling the 
national symbolic domain” (Kubik, 1994, p. 50), it left many loopholes for the 
expression of national identity that was not congruent with the Soviet image.  Thus, the 
national and communist ideas existed simultaneously rather visibly through the display 
of symbols.  As Kubik points out, 
symbols, the most subtle and powerful regulators of thought and action, cannot 
be imposed by force, law, or administrative fiat.  They usually arise and evolve 
spontaneously.  Signs and emblems newly imposed by the authorities or 
collectively constructed do not become symbols until they are spontaneously 
accepted by those for whom they are created.  (p. 50) 
 
Hence the regime’s decision to gradually remodel the existing symbols without 
eradicating those that were not posing a direct threat or contradict the new Communist 
creed.  Kubik (1994) summarizes some of the opposing forces that were present during 
that remodeling process: 
Gierek’s regime made sure, through a series of constitutional, legal, and political 
changes, that the status quo political order was reinforced.  It also intensified the 
propagation of Communist ideology.  At the same time, however, it strove to 
improve the Polish self-image and cultivate national pride.  Warsaw Castle 
became perhaps the major symbol of the new socialist patriotism, carefully 
separated from older forms of patriotism (now called nationalism), which were 
not sufficiently infused with socialist overtones.  The new reality, which 
supposedly was “socialist in content and national in form,” was to be accepted, 
not discussed.  (p. 51) 
 
This point has also been made by Smith (2009), who argues that in order for elites to 
reach common ground with the rest of the population of a nation, the selected symbols, 
myths, memories, etc., need to resonate with members of that nation. 
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This is exactly what various early nationalist scholars—philologists, 
philosophers, lexicographers and historians—attempted to achieve in Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans in the Ottoman and Habsburg empires.  Contrary to 
those who claim that these traditions are ‘invented’, ethno-symbolists argue that 
only those symbolic elements that have some prior resonance among a large 
section of the population (and especially of its dominant ethnie) will be able to 
furnish the content of the proposed nation’s political culture.  (p. 31) 
 
As Poland’s economic situation kept worsening during the 1970s, Gierek’s 
miscalculated economic reform forced him to incorporate a patriotic emphasis during 
some of the later state ceremonies (e.g., the 35
th
 anniversary of the Polish People’s 
Republic), instead of an internationalistic one, as a way of distraction.  His was another 
significant contribution towards the beginning of the end.  The power of symbols came 
into play here and challenged the regime’s perceived status quo of communication and 
reality: 
The rejection of Gierek’s “master fiction” by large segments of the populace 
became possible only when the Church and the opposition developed their own 
counterhegemonic discourses and presented them publicly.  By so doing they 
undermined the regime’s monopoly on social communication and furnished the 
people with conceptual symbolic tools to define the social reality afresh.  
(Kubik, p. 73)  
 
Solidarity spread quickly and approximately 10 million people across Poland—one 
fourth of the country’s population—joined the trade union as members.  This locally 
mobilized social movement that contributed to the demise of Soviet ideology received 
support from the Catholic Church in Poland, partially through the “free spaces” created 
by religious policy during communism.  The removal of direct control of the 
authoritarian regime created those free spaces and allowed for the emergence of a 
catalyst that aided the construction of anti-regime political mobilization (Polletta, 1999).  
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The Polish Revolution  
What is a revolution?  According to Walzer, a contributor The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy (2005, edited by Honderich), it is  
[a] radical political upheaval or transformation.  Originally understood through 
an astronomical metaphor, revolutions were cyclical processes moving through 
four stages: tyranny, resistance, civil war, and restoration.  In modern times, the 
term has shed that reference and come to designate a chance in constitution, 
regime, and social order.  The change is intentional and programmatic, 
undertaken on the basis of an ideological argument painting the old regime as 
tyrannical, corrupt, or oppressive, promising a new age, and justifying the 
(usually high) costs involved.  (p. 817) 
 
The Solidarity movement created a “new model of revolution—the new model of 1989, 
which replaces the old model of 1789” (Ash, 2009, p. 56), which was a historical event 
between nationalism and internationalism.  The workers movement, also called the 
Polish Revolution (Ash, 2002), became the first free trade union in the Soviet bloc—the 
ironic use of Marxist-Leninist worker organizing against a system inspired by these 
doctrines.  The events that took place during the social movement became “glocal” as 
everyone was watching Solidarity, representing the resurgence of Polish pride and 
defiance of Soviet ideology. 
What makes Solidarity such an interesting case for the study of social 
movements and revolutions is the aforementioned new model of revolution, which does 
“not fit easily into any preconceived notion of revolutionary change in Europe” (Auer, 
2004, p. 364).  Solidarity adopted the model of “self-limiting revolution” that “had been 
conceived during the 1970s by Eastern European activists in the aftermath of two 
cataclysmic failures: the 1956 Hungarian uprising from below and the 1968 ‘Prague 
Spring,’ a paradigmatic (if ill-fated) instance of enlightened reform from above” 
(Wolin, 2005, p. 2).  Those revolutions were crushed by tanks, courtesy of the Warsaw 
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Pact, thus the later need for an alternative strategy.  This new alternative model was 
approached with a non-violent and non-ideological strategy.  The leaders of the 
revolutions “appealed to a set of basic human values, assuming that a regime built on 
hypocrisy, greed and conformism could be defeated by truthfulness and a sense of basic 
human decency” (Auer, 2004, p. 265).  
Solidarity’s success can be attributed, among other factors, to their exploitation 
of an ideological weakness of the communist system, since the “so-called workers’ 
states of Eastern Europe were unique in denying those same workers the basic rights to 
organize, a right they still enjoyed in the ‘capitalist West’” (Wolin, 2005, p. 2).  
Although the mass movement was stopped in its tracks by the martial law after about 16 
months, the “developments in Poland in 1980-81 presented an ideological challenge” 
(Brown, 2009, p. 429).  That ideological challenge, presented to the authoritarian 
regime not only by the workers, but by the collaborative effort of workers and 
intellectuals, created serious dents in the system and delivered its final blow when it 
regained its strength in 1989.  At that point, there was no recovery possible for the 
gradually crumbling ideology. 
One of the most important points in a social movement is the catalyst and the 
way people participating in the movement communicate and network the ideas leading 
up to the public voicing of the need for change.  All revolutionary movements start out 
as communication—social change always starts out symbolically with an anti-thesis 
(e.g., essays, political tracts, street art, etc.)—this creates a hole in the space-time fabric.  
The year 1989 has been carved into global memory as a year of significant 
change, haling the end of an ideology.  What it meant for the different parties involved 
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still seems to diverge, as Stokes (2009) points out,  
When communism collapsed, Americans felt they had won, whereas Russians, 
as Vladimir Putin has put it, saw it as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 
twentieth century.  For those in the rest of the world, the end of the cold war had 
another meaning: the end of old-fashioned colonialism.  (p. 12)  
 
In his treatise of postcommunism, Sakwa (1999) discusses several problems with 
Marx’s idea of revolutionism and the revolutionary state.  One of them that Marx 
“never resolved the problem of the state” and thus “his vision of commune democracy 
suggested a thoroughly decentralized self-managing model of politics, but how the 
economic life of the community would be run was left vague” (p. 13).  The reason to 
point out this particular weakness in the demise of communist rule is because it played a 
pivotal role in Poland’s wave of protests and underground movement initiatives, 
including the famous independent trade union Solidarity and its powerful symbols of 
change.  
National Symbols 
 National symbols are a naturalized part of our everyday experience, but 
according to Geisler (2005), they are not natural, instead they constitute conventional 
signs.  Geisler is asking what national symbols, such as anthems and flags “do to us” 
when they elicit an emotional response, which is relevant to the questions this study is 
trying to answer.  He argues that “in most cases, the signifier of a national symbol 
involves a historical reference shared by all members of the nation but not always 
easily accessible to foreigners” and he claims that “this shared historical memory, 
condensed in the symbol, is not a natural bond but a conventional one.  It needs to be 
renewed through constant rehearsal, lest its original meaning be lost” (pp. XVIII-XIX 
[emphasis added).  Geisler also mentions that the study of national symbols has not 
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received ample attention, namely that “most of the major historians and theorists of 
nationalism…were too preoccupied with debates about the definition, origins, and 
historical merits or demerits of nationalism to worry about the rhetoric of the symbolic 
realm” (p. XX).  
 As mentioned earlier, even though the study of national symbols has been 
expanding over the past few years, the focus of the present study on the communicative 
nature of national symbols and their role in social change adds a new dimension that 
will potentially have interdisciplinary ramifications.   
In a recent study examining the role of national symbols and ceremonies in 
nation building, centered around national flags and national days, Elgenius (2011) gave 
some of the reasons why national symbols and ceremonies are important: 
Nations become visible through their symbols (flags, anthems and emblems), 
ceremonies (national days, regional festivities, national holidays and 
international sporting events), museums and monuments (collections, memorials 
and statues), the land itself (the landscape and the capital city as a historical 
centre for institutions and location for ceremonials) and defined borders 
(passports, membership, citizenship, nationality, insiders and outsiders).  (p. 2) 
 
According to Elgenius, (2011) ”symbols and ceremonies mirror the pursuit of nations, 
the nation-ness becomes visible through these symbolic measures, and their acceptance 
provides a tangible measure of recognition—given from within and/or without” (p. 2). 
She proposes a temporal categorization of nation building that “can be understood in 
light of symbols and ceremonies appearing with reference to pre-modern (pre-1789), 
modern (ca. 1789-1914) and post-imperial (ca. 1914-) symbolic regimes” (p. 4, italics in 
original).  Elgenius explains the temporal categorization and elaborates on the types of 
flags that were used in different time periods, corresponding to different symbolic 
regimes, respectively. 
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Pre-modern symbolism appears with religious or monarchial sanctioned 
communities.  The Cross flags that survived to modern times were originally 
used in warfare whereas the national days with pre-modern origins, as a rule, 
were religious holidays later nationalized or transformed into national days.  The 
national flags and national days that emerged during the modern symbolic 
regime honour revolutions, the signing of constitutions, the formation of unions 
and the declaration of independence as would be expected after 1789.  The 
tricolour flags broke with earlier religious symbolism and appeared with secular 
ideals.  Within the more recent post-imperial regime, established after 1914, 
nations display pre-modern heraldic devices or colours on their flags (heraldic 
flags) in order to justify the existence of the nation and the state in the present.  
Nationalists often wish to refer to an ancient past as a mechanism to sanction 
contemporary nations and/or states and it is through such symbols that the past 
remains in the present and tells us something about the importance of history in 
the making of nations.  (pp. 4-5, italics in original) 
 
This categorization is comparable to Smith’s (2009) ethno-symbolist argument 
mentioned earlier regarding the pre-modern origins of nations.  In his ethno-symbolic 
approach to the study of nations and nationalism, he points out that  
many of the East European and Asian nations were created around pre-existing 
ethnies or ethnic networks, whether in Poland or Hungary, Slovakia or Finland, 
or on the basis of dominant ethnies in states such as Iran, Sri Lanka, Burma and 
Vietnam, and it was these ethnic ties that formed the basis of subsequent 
nations. (p. 44) 
 
Smith (2009) asserts that the dominant ethnies have been responsible for providing 
these new national states “with their public cultures, their symbolic codes and 
repertoires, and many of their laws and customs” over time based on “pre-existing 
cultural and political ties” (p. 44), thus offering a counter-argument to the modern idea 
of nation forming.  
Why do people and communities around the globe fight for and against 
symbols?   Why does it matter if those symbols are categorized as national symbols, and 
what puts them in that category?  Different symbolic universes, to use a term 
established by Berger and Luckmann (1966), that manifest themselves as sociological 
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communities, such as nations, have each their respective reality.  The nation has been 
defined by Smith (2009), as “a named and self-defining human community whose 
members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and 
are attached to historic territories or ‘homelands’, create and disseminate a distinctive 
public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws” (p. 29).  Once the 
status quo of the reality of a collective, in this case that of a nation, is challenged by an 
alternative symbolic system with an alternative reality, the sense of threat will activate 
mechanisms of protection of the status quo.  Such mechanisms can take different forms 
of course, depending on the level of perceived or real threat. Berger and Luckmann 
(1966) provide some explanations and examples of how symbolic universes have 
operated in the past:  
Historically, the problem of heresy has often been the first impetus for the 
systematic theoretical conceptualization of symbolic universes.  The 
development of Christian theological thought as a result of a series of heretical 
challenges to the “official” tradition provides excellent historical illustrations for 
this process…For instance, the precise Christological formulations of the early 
church councils were necessitated not by the tradition itself but by the heretical 
challenges to it. As these formulations were elaborated, the tradition was 
maintained and expanded at the same time.  Thus there emerged, among other 
innovations, a theoretical conception of the Trinity that was not only 
unnecessary but actually non-existent in the early Christian community.  In other 
words, the symbolic universe is not only legitimated but also modified by the 
conceptual machineries constructed to ward off the challenge of heretical groups 
within a society.  (p. 107)   
 
Continuing that thought, they also accurately observed that “the appearance of an 
alternative symbolic universe poses a threat because its very existence demonstrates 
empirically that one’s own universe is less than inevitable” (p. 108).  A prime example 
of this observation are the events that led to the demise of the Soviet empire.  The 
Communist regime was unable to ward off the influence of the alternative symbolic 
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universe as represented by Solidarity, which has shown the Communist symbolic 
universe was more than evitable.  
The confrontation of alternative symbolic universes implies a problem of 
power—which of the conflicting definitions of reality will be “made to stick” in 
the society.  Two societies confronting each other with conflicting universes will 
both develop conceptual machineries designed to maintain their respective 
universes. (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 109) 
 
Methodology 
As the main unit of analysis concerns national symbols, the author chose 
semiotic analysis as the method for this study.  The selection of national symbols 
consists of the cross, the painting of the Black Madonna of Częstochowa, and the 
National Stadium in Warsaw.  Previous studies of national symbols have mostly 
focused on national flags, national days, and national anthems, in the context of nation 
forming and the construction of national identity.  The reason for selecting symbols that 
are not typically covered by studies of national symbols is to broaden the understanding 
of what national symbols are and what actions they can motivate.   
More specifically, the author chose the cross because it is one of the most 
dominant and ubiquitously present national symbols in Poland; it has unified and 
divided Poles throughout history, and its continuous presence in the private and public 
sphere is integral to understanding the Polish experience.  The image of the Black 
Madonna of Częstochowa has also been a ubiquitous presence and is often times linked 
to the cross for the evident reason that both are religious symbols.  Additionally, the 
significance of the Black Madonna is tied to a general admiration or cult of Mary that is 
tangible in Poland’s everyday culture.  As a third symbol, the author chose the National 
Stadium because the complex history of this symbol within the built environment of the 
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capital city has a lot to say about social processes that manifest Polish national identity, 
but can also be applied to and explain other contexts of semiotic space.  These three 
symbols are representative of the Polish culture and have been chosen with the purpose 
to explain the different processes of social change and transformation that will ideally 
offer valid interpretation models outside of that culture.  These symbols will be first 
analyzed individually, and then situated within a larger semiotic landscape of nation and 
social change.        
Semiotics has been described as a field, a science, a philosophy, and as a 
method, amongst other categorizations.  This method is based on a highly 
interdisciplinary subject grounded in several schools of thought, which determine the 
methodological approach to studying particular signs in a particular sign system, which 
has been explored earlier in this study.   
Specific semiotic modalities are addressed by such specialists as linguists, art 
historians and anthropologists, but we must turn to semioticians if we wish to 
study meaning-making and representation across modalities.  Semiotics provides 
us with a potentially unifying conceptual framework and a set of methods and 
concepts for use across the full range of signifying practices, which include 
gesture, posture, dress, writing, speech, photography, the mass media and the 
Internet.  (Chandler, 2002, p. 214) 
 
In semiotics, when confronted with text, the researcher does not claim to write the one, 
correct interpretation once and for everybody.  Semiotics is an analytic approach that 
should provoke further thinking; just like hermeneutics is never complete, in semiotics 
the conversation never ends.  It is an empirical method, the text needs to be available to 
others, and it has to be sensory-based, which is the case in this study.   
Semiotics is primarily a textual analysis, now also associated with cultural 
studies, that as a method “seeks to analyse texts as structured wholes and investigates 
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latent, connotative meanings” (Chandler, 2002, p. 8).  The chosen approach for this 
study will mainly draw from Eco and to some extent from Barthes.  Since the author 
does not align herself entirely with neither the Peircean nor the structuralist traditions, 
an approach that bridges those two seems to be the best fit for the choice of 
methodology.  Eco has been acting as one of those bridges, as he attempted to “combine 
the structuralist perspective of Hjelmsev with the cognitive-interpretive semiotics of 
Peirce” (Eco, 1999, p. 251).   
Given that the units of analysis are national symbols and considering the role 
conventions play in the meaning and understanding of symbols, Eco’s concept of codes 
and the fact that “cultural convention is the basic criterion of his definitions” (Nöth, 
1995, p. 211) of those codes makes his approach compatible with the purpose of this 
study.  Eco talks about the semiotic field as a “metaphor for the plurality of codes which 
are possible subjects of semiotic research” (Nöth, 1995, p. 212).  Codes are systems of 
signs and while “Eco suggested that it is not true that a code organizes signs but rather it 
is more correct to say that codes provide the rules that generate the signs” (Moriarty, 
2005, p. 235, referring to Eco’s A Theory of Semiotics).  
 In view of the definitions and theories of symbols as well as the semiotic context 
of consciousness structures derived from the theory of dimensional accrual and 
dissociation, codes in the semiotic field will be a useful for the interpretation and a 
better understanding of the role of national symbols in social change.  Nöth (1995) 
makes the following observation regarding Eco’s semiotic thresholds: 
While events of natural semiosis remain unaffected by cultural conventions, 
their interpretation changes with time and culture.  Even that mode of 
interpretation which comes closest to the reality of the facts of natural semiosis, 
namely, scientific explanation, is still affected by culture, as the changes in the 
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world models of physics show.  In archaic times, for example, lightning was 
once understood as the gesture of a supernatural being.  Modern meteorology 
explains it as an electrical phenomenon.  These two modes of explanation 
exemplify the shift from a mythic code to a scientific code as the basis of the 
interpretation of natural semiosis.  (pp. 213-214, [emphasis added]) 
 
Another important concept for the analysis of national symbols is the idea of binary 
oppositions, which ties into identity.     
Structuralists emphasize the importance of relations of paradigmatic opposition.  
Largely through the influence of Jakobson, the primary analytical method 
employed by many structuralist semioticians involves the identification of 
binary or polar semantic oppositions (e.g. us-them, public-private) in texts or 
signifying practices.  Such a quest is based on a form of ‘dualism’.  Dualism 
seems to be deeply rooted in the development of human categorization.  
(Chandler, 2002, p. 101) 
 
In order to understand what makes symbols so powerful and why they matter in 
questions of identity, the semiotic principle of difference needs to be mentioned again.  
The principle of difference is a necessary condition for identity.  For instance, being 
Polish is different from being German, and is different from being Russian.  We identify 
others as what they are and as what they are not.  Chandler (2002) notes, “while for 
Saussure the meaning of signs derives from how they differ from each other, Derrida 
coined the term différance to allude also to the way in which meaning is endlessly 
deferred” (p. 75).  
Interpretation and meaning are critical concepts for understanding human 
behavior and symbols are a prime example of carriers or containers of meaning that 
require interpretation in order to make sense of the world we live in.  As communication 
scholars, and social scientists in general, we attempt to reach meaningful conclusions 
and to some of us the “logical extension of the understanding of reality” can be 
expressed this way:   
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If it is the case that people live in a social world rather than a natural one and if 
they perceive what occurs through their own understanding of reality, then 
researchers are no more able to directly observe reality than is anyone else. 
(Leeds-Hurwitz, 1993, p. 36, italics in original) 
As symbol, interpretation, and meaning are intertwined concepts, the author attempts an 
analysis of symbols that are tied to Polish nationality and have played important roles in 
initiating and sustaining the revolutionary movement of Solidarity through an 
interpretation of the semiotic field of codes.  The analysis also includes the symbolic 
character of collective memory and the way it motivates and mobilizes masses by 
evoking passion and emotionally binding people to challenge the status quo.  
Discussion 
The Catholic Church and the Nation under the Cross  
When Zubrzycki (2006) describes the genealogy of Polish nationalism, she 
points out that “every nation has its myth of foundation” and although those myths 
change over time, they stay and as such are timeless in that sense, “and only that sense” 
(p. 34).   
The most common and pervasive Polish myth is that of Poland’s intrinsic 
Catholicity: Polonia semper fidelis (Poland always faithful), the bulwark of 
Christendom defending Europe against the infidel (however defined); the Christ 
of nations, martyred for the sins of the world, resurrected for the world’s 
salvation; a nation whose identity is conserved and guarded by its defender, the 
Roman Catholic Church, and shielded by its Queen, the miraculous Black 
Madonna, Our Lady of Częstochowa; a nation that has given the world a pope 
and rid the Western world of Communism…If this representation is a caricature 
of the myth, it is, like all caricatures, distorted only by the picture’s being drawn 
with rather oversharp angles. (Zubrzycki, 2006, p. 34) 
 
Before discussing the symbolism of the Black Madonna, which, just like the national 
hero Pope John Paul II plays a crucial role in Poland’s religious identity, the focus will 
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be on the Catholic Church and how its role elevated the cross to a national symbol.  The 
role of the Catholic Church in Polish society is a result of three historical events:  
the baptism of Duke Mieszko I in 966; the close identification of the church with 
Polish nationalism during the partitions, occupations, and externally imposed 
governments of the past two centuries; and the creation of a nearly homogenous 
Catholic nation through the murder and expulsion of Jews and through the 
ethnic migrations resulting from Stalin’s movement of the Polish state westward 
in the late 1940s. (Byrnes, 2001, p. 30) 
 
Consequently, the majority of Poland’s population has been and still is Roman Catholic.   
 
Morawska (1987) claimed that it was Catholicism that played a major role in 
defining the nation, whereas Osa (1989) advised caution regarding such claims, noting 
that “[t]he components of association between Catholicism and Polish nationalism have 
gone through  as many permutations as have the boundaries of Poland” (p. 277).  
Between 1795 and 1918, which marked the time period of the partitions, the church was 
crucial for Poland’s survival as a nation, but its support for Poland’s independence was 
hindered by the Vatican’s own institutional interests (Byrnes, 2001).  This argument has 
been strongly supported by Porter (2011), who based his claim that the church did not 
always support Poland’s political goals on an impressive amount of archival research.  
According to the documents he studied, Polish national identity has not always been as 
strongly associated with the Catholic Church as it has been assumed.  Interestingly, the 
perpetuated myth of the church’s alleged support of Poland’s political ambitions from 
the beginning of the nation’s existence seems to have solidified the identification of 
Polishness and Catholicism. 
The support returned during the Second World War when both the Polish people 
and the Catholic clergy suffered; many bishops and priests were murdered during the 
Nazi occupation.  Furthermore, “in addition to limiting and controlling the clergy, the 
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state attempted to rewrite history books to play down the role of the Church in Poland’s 
history” (Juergensmeyer, 1993, p. 136).  One member of the clergy who was among the 
survivors, Stefan Wyszyński, became a national hero following the war.  He was the 
“chaplain to the wartime underground and future primate of Poland” and he associated 
the church “with resistance to Nazi rule and in time with the revived Polish nationalism 
that followed” (Byrnes, 2001, p. 31).  He has been quoted as proclaiming, “Next to 
God, our first love is Poland” (as cited in Byrnes, 2001, p. 31).  
The Catholic Church played an even greater role during the communist regime, 
openly supporting the opposition movement.  Byrnes (2001) described that role as  
firmly concrete, in that the church offered the nation everything from free space 
for the exploration of Polish history and culture to meeting halls and 
communication equipment necessary for political mobilization.  Yet the 
church’s political role was also deeply symbolic, in that it served as a living 
exemplar of independence and what many Poles called authenticity.  (pp. 31-32 
[emphasis added) 
 
When Karol Wojtyła became Pope John Paul II in 1978, the Polish Church gained 
political importance once more and his first visit to Poland as pope in 1979 made a great 
dent in the regime’s confidence and power.  The day of the pope’s visit marked one of 
the greatest moments in Poland’s history and the “historical and mythological 
justification could not be better: on 8 May 1979, Catholic Poland was to celebrate the 
nine-hundredth anniversary of Saint Stanisław’s martyrdom, Wojtyła’s predecessor to 
the Kraków bishopric” (Kubik, 1994, p. 129).  Saint Stanisław is one of the two patron 
saints (in addition to Mother of God) of Poland; he “has been proclaimed as the patron 
of Poland on 8 September 1253” (Kubik, 1994, p. 130).  Here the historical layers and 
connections are an important part of the myth-making.  Because symbols are rooted in 
history, the more history they have, the less likely they become dissociated and 
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arbitrary, the more they are embedded in a magic-mythic consciousness.  The number 
of “holy” men that is presented here in succession, as well as the of the holy woman 
personified by the Black Madonna, creates a strong bond between the sacred beings and 
their ties to the Polish nation.  There seems to be a sense of immediacy, a connection 
between the “chosen” people and the fact that they are Polish, such as Saint Stanisław 
and Pope John Paul II, who has been canonized on April 27
th
, 2014, thus joining the 
ranks and confirming the myth.  To the religious, magic-mythic person this is not a 
coincidence, it is not arbitrary.  
 The symbolic manipulation of the Polish people that took place during the 
preparations for the pope’s visit was not successful, despite the authorities’ elaborate 
attempt to limit the population’s access and exposure to the pope’s speech as well as 
trying to place the pope’s visit in the context of the republic’s thirty-fifth anniversary, 
thus avoiding the association with the Saint Stanisław myth.  The message of the myth, 
“that secular power should be counterbalanced by ecclesiastical authority—was 
unacceptable to the Communist regime” (Kubik, 1994, p. 135).  The reason why this 
was unacceptable to the communists is because the communist worldview is more 
modern and dissociated, and having any kind of entity, such as an ecclesiastical 
authority, being part of the decision-making apparatus would challenge their worldview 
and potentially their undermine their political power.  When political power is being 
shared by representatives with different consciousness structures, there is more potential 
for conflict of interpretation and confrontations over who decides what things mean.  
This is the politics of symbology, whoever is in power has the ability to determine what 
is real, which refers back the idea of privileged realities as mentioned earlier.  This 
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conflict transcends geopolitical borders and is the reason why many governments insist 
on separating church and state.  
Apart from being on a symbolically significant date, the use of space provided a 
symbolic importance of its own: “The altar for the first pontifical mass held in Warsaw 
that day was erected in the middle of Victory Square (a site hitherto used only for state 
ceremonies) and was seen on TV throughout the whole country” (Kubik, 1994, p. 139).  
It led to a symbolic reclaiming of a public place by the Polish people, even if for a short 
moment.  The event where the binary opposition between public versus private, and 
“theirs” versus “ours”, as well as the temporary blurring of lines in a semiotic landscape 
manifesting themselves during the pope’s visit, has been referred to as a second baptism 
for Poland.  Planting a religious structure, such as an altar, in the center of a space 
claimed by an opposite ideology, a place named Victory Square, nonetheless, signified 
one of many events that chipped away at the legitimacy of the communist regime. 
According to Kubik (1994), the Viennese Cardinal König called the event a 
“psychological earthquake” and numerous observers “described the social consequence 
of the visit as a catharsis” (p. 139, italics in original).  Kubik quoted a comment from an 
independent observer, a Polish author, which serves as an excellent example that 
demonstrates the concepts of collective effervescence and the emotional appeal of 
symbols that evokes passion and signifies the binding power of those symbols that 
reach to the roots of a national identity: 
The emotions of the crowds welcoming the pope can hardly be compared with 
those of the crowd officially organized to march in the May Day parade.  The 
long-term impact of the pope’s visit on the collective imagination can prove, 
however, to be even more significant: no doubt it will move the deepest layers 
of national consciousness…It should be remembered that symbols which 
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organize national consciousness stimulate activities whose results are quite 
tangible.  (as cited in Kubik, pp. 139-140) 
 
 
The pope’s first visit in Poland lasted nine days and can be characterized as 
transformational.  Those days were accompanied by an array of symbolic expressions of 
national consciousness and possibilities of renewal, provided by a glimpse of an 
alternative symbolic universe.  According to Kubik’s (1994) assessment, “the operative 
efficacy of the visit was created when the pope presented to the people a 
counterhegemonic model of sociopolitical reality firmly embedded in a religious 
worldview” (p. 149), thus catering to and strengthening the chosen identity of a 
religious community.  Here, again, is a contestation of the legitimacy of realities by a 
religious figure.  Religious symbols gained importance in the eighties, when 
Catholicism took on the role of a “civic religion” of sorts, “and its symbols and ethical 
teachings were generally accepted even by people who held opposed metaphysical 
beliefs” (Koczanowicz, 2008, p. 101).  The fact that Catholicism transcended 
metaphysical beliefs speaks to the binding power of religio (Kramer, 2012) and the 
emotional identification it provided at a time when the need for standing together in 
solidarity was crucial for the gradual and self-limiting revolution leading to social 
change. 
 According to Smith (1991), “religious communities are often closely related to 
ethnic identities” (p. 6), which, among many ethnic communities such as Catholics in 
Poland, can translate to an identity “based on religious criteria of differentiation” (p. 7).  
In the case of Poland, the choice of Catholicism over Protestantism and Orthodoxy was 
mainly based on the desire to establish an identity, in opposition to the two main threats 
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to Poland’s sovereignty and independence.  Those two nations, Germany and Russia, 
can be described as the other.  Semiotic icons and symbols have been manufactured and 
used to control identity in part by defying the purposeful and accidental encroachment 
of the other.   
Modern Polish national identity by the end of the century was being constituted 
and reconstituted through the opposition to ‘Others’: Protestant Germans in the 
west and Orthodox Russians in the east.  The initial impetus for this oppositional 
identity was thus rooted in cultural and political geography, though it was 
reinforced through colonial domination by these ‘external Others’ and exploited 
as such by Polish nation-builders.  (Zubrzycki, 2006, pp. 54-55) 
 
It was the proximity of the other and the era of European romanticism that inspired the 
image of the crucified nation with Poland as the martyr on the cross.  That image has 
been made popular by the patriotic Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855).  Among 
many poetic achievements, including the epic poem Pan Tadeusz, “regarded by some 
literary historians as the finest jewel in Polish literature” (Davies, 2008, p. 6), 
Mickiewicz wrote a political tract The Books of the Polish Nation and of the Polish 
Pilgrimage that he dedicated to the idea of freedom for Poland.  The following is an 
excerpt from a fable included in The Books: 
…in idolatrous Europe there rose three rulers; the name of the first was Fredrick 
the Second of Prussia, the name of the second was Catherine the Second of 
Russia, the name of the third was Theresa of Austria…And this was a satanic 
trinity, contrary to the Divine Trinity, and was in the manner of a mock and a 
derision of all that is…But the Polish Nation alone did not bow down to the new 
idol…And finally, Poland said: “Whosoever will come to me shall be free and 
equal, for I am FREEDOM…the Kings when they heard of this were terrified in 
their hearts, and said…”Come, let us slay this nation”…And they martyred the 
Polish Nation, and laid in its grace, and the kings cried out “We have slain and 
buried Freedom”…the Polish Nation did not die…on the third day the soul shall 
return to the body, and the Nation shall rise, and free all the peoples of Europe 
from slavery. And already two days have gone by.  One day ended with the first 
capture of Warsaw, and the second day ended with the second capture of 
Warsaw, and the third day shall begin, but shall not end.  And as after the 
resurrection of Christ blood sacrifices ceased in all the world, so after the 
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resurrection of the Polish Nation wars shall cease in all Christendom.  
(Mickiewicz, as cited in Noyes, 1944, pp. 376-380)  
  
The poet alluded to the partitions by Prussia, Austria and Russia, who “in their decision 
to devour their neighbour, the adjacent rulers only acted as arrogant leaders usually act 
when they possess the means to aggrandize themselves and when historical 
circumstances provide the opportunity” (Davies, 2008, p. 6).  Although Mickiewicz, the 
“poet-apostle of Polish nationalism” (p. 8) was born after his country disappeared from 
the political map and never got to know it as a country, his patriotic spirit seemed even 
stronger for it.  His emotional identification can be mostly explained through his 
primarily magic worldview, which is reflected in his prose as well as poetry.  
Interestingly, his symbolic code has allowed him to imagine a country he never knew 
through the romanticized idea of a signified nation.  And he obviously wasn’t the only 
one.  
Polish mythology holds that Polish nation, repeatedly crucified on the cross of 
partition and occupation, will one day rise again at the center of Europe to serve 
as both an example to, and a redeemer of, the rest of the continent.  Nourished 
by the example of Jan Sobieski, the Polish king who defended Vienna (and thus 
European civilization) from the Turks in the seventeenth century, the national 
myth holds the Polish nation up as the “bulwark of western Christianity,’ the 
foundation of the church’s age-old struggle with both secularists and other 
religions.  (Byrnes, 2001, pp. 34-35) 
 
The messianic interpretation of Polish destiny as the Christ of the nations has also found 
its symbolic expression in Mickiewicz’s poetry, such as his poetic drama Dziady or 
Forefathers’ Eve. Here is an excerpt from Part III: 
 I see my nation bound, all Europe drags him on 
And mocks him: 
 “To the judgment hall!” – The multitude leads in the  
  guiltless man. 
 Mouths, without hearts or hands, are judges here,  
 And all shout, “Gaul—Let Gaul be judge!” 
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 Gaul found no fault in him—and washed his hands; 
 And yet the kings shout, “Judge him! Punish him! 
 His blood shall be on us and on our children;  
 Crucify Mary’s son and loose Barabbas! 
 He scorneth Caesar’s crown: crucify him,  
 Or we will say, thouh art not Caesar’s friend.” 
 And Gaul delivered him unto the people— 
 They led him forth—and then this innocent head 
 Grew bloodstained from the mocking crown of thorns;  
 They raised him up in sight of all the world— 
 The people thronged to see—and Gaul cried out,  
 “Behold the free and independent nation!” 
 
 I see the cross.— O Lord, how long, how long 
 Must he still bear it? Lord, be merciful! 
 Strengthen thy servant lest he fall and die! 
 The cross has arms that shadow all of Europe,  
 Made of three withered peoples, like dead trees. 
 Now is my nation on the martyr’s throne. 
 He speaks and says, “I thirst,” and Rakus gives him 
 To drink of vinegar, and Borus, fall, 
 While Mother Freedom stands below and weeps. 
 And now a soldier hired in Muscovy 
 Comes forward with his pike and pierces him, 
 And from my guiltless nation blood has gushed,  
 What hast thou done, most stupid myrmidon,  
 Most heartless! Yet he only shall repent— 
 And God will pardon him his sins at last. 
 
 O my beloved! He droops his dying head 
 And now in a loud voice he calls, “My God, 
 My God, and why hast thou forsaken me?” 
  And he is dead. 
 (as cited in Noyes, 1944, pp. 292-293) 
 
As Davies notes, the lines from the Forefathers’ Eve, Part III present an extended 
metaphor and a figurative personification of the historical events, where “France (Gaul) 
plays the part of Pontius Pilate, the Roman procurator who complied with judicial 
murder and washed his hands of innocent blood; the crucifiers…are Prussia, Russia and 
Austria” who “divided the spoils not unlike the Roman soldiers who cast lots for the 
garments of Jesus at the food of the cross” (p. 10).  He also adds that Mickiewicz 
74 
 
conflated France’s role with the immolation of 1831, “when, so to speak, Poland was 
crucified afresh” (p. 10).  This is very much an example of mythic communication, 
which was characteristic of Romanticism.  Mickiewicz was not the only literary figure 
who applied the Christ analogy as a poetic device when talking about the Polish nation, 
but he was the most prominent one.  Until this day, the Polish Idea is signified through 
Mickiewicz’s works.  His poetry included some elements representative of a mythic 
consciousness that Davies points out: “’Now my soul is incarnate in my country,’ 
declared the hero in Forefathers’ Eve, ‘My body has swallowed her soul, and I and my 
country are one’” (as cited in Davies, 2008, p. 12).  Such imagery of presenting a 
country as one with an individual, thus alluding to an association with the sign, is a 
good example of using mythic consciousness to emphasize the importance of emotional 
identification 
 The symbolic expressions of romantic nationalism offered solace to a battered 
nation that was subjected to the Russian rule at the time.  Elevating one’s nation to a 
pure figure such as Christ, and seeing that Christ-like nation as the future redeemer and 
savior of other nations from oppression, and assuming the role of a martyr and a hero 
that will bring down the evil empires, are all part of a mythical consciousness.   
The Polish nation was not ethnically homogenous before World War II; during 
the Romantic era “to be Polish had to do primarily with spiritual loyalties, with invisible 
rather than visible ties.  A Pole was someone who felt himself to be a Pole” and yet “the 
nationalist who thus exalted the Poland of the spirit also promoted the veneration of the 
Polish language, preparing the way for a more linguistic and eventually more ethnic 
understanding of Polishness”.  Thus, “with the emergence of more intolerant political 
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movements, a harsh and racially tinged nationalism scornful of romantic and religious 
values was destined to arise” (Davies, 2008, p. 14).  After World War II, while 
colonized by the Soviet system, some of the romantic sentiments returned, as well as 
did the religious values.  They never entirely disappeared, but the aftermath of the war 
and the subjugation to a totalitarian regime proved to be a fertile ground for those 
values once again, thus validating the argument the theory of dimensional accrual and 
dissociation makes about different consciousness structures being more efficient than 
others at different times of need.  In this case, the magic-mythic structure seemed more 
efficient as survival and endurance tactic. 
After the fall communism, the role of the church developed a different dynamic.  
It had its own agenda and one of the church’s advantages was that in the early 1990s it 
was “the most organized and most coherent institutional presence in a rather chaotic 
political environment” (Byrnes, 2001, p. 33).  Those who became supportive of the 
church and perceived the possibility of continuous collaborative efforts to counteract 
the Soviet empire and build a new Poland, including Michnik (1993), became 
disillusioned when the collaboration dissipated and political agendas took over.  Despite 
some conflicts of interest, the church has remained an important part in Polish society.   
However, as the time of crisis has passed, the role of the church has changed and 
although still an important cultural institution, its influence has weakened.  But the 
presence of the cross as a national symbol, a unifying and dividing one at times, has 
remained strong as can be seen in the following discussion revolving around cross 
controversies in the more recent past. 
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An example of a contested symbolic landscape that has been characterized as a 
framework for competing national memories is Auschwitz/Oświęcim.  Both Jews and 
Poles have been claiming the site as symbolizing their memory of tragedy.  Outhwaite 
and Ray (2005) reference Kapralski (2001), who “argues that for Jews, Auschwitz 
symbolizes the Holocaust, the event that condensed a history of anti-Semitic 
persecutions, and therefore is a symbol of Jewish uniqueness in the face of annihilation” 
and for the Poles, “Auschwitz symbolizes the Polish tragedy during World War II, 
which was a condensed history of German attempts to subordinate and eventually 
destroy the Polish nation” (Outhwaite & Ray, 2005, p. 185). The Jews expressed their 
need for rhetorical ownership of the symbol in order to received acknowledgment of 
anti-Semitic persecutions that have been downplayed during the communist period.  
“Polish nationalists”, on the other hand, tried to justify their need for rhetorical 
ownership of the symbol as an opportunity to “redefine identity via the memory of 
Auschwitz—as a solely ‘Polish’ place and a national-religious symbol” (p. 186). 
The conflict over competing national memories escalated when in 1984 
Carmelite nuns established a convent in Auschwitz, overlooking the camp site and 
decided to erect 100 crosses within the boundaries of the camp.  Following protests 
from Jewish groups, an agreement between representatives of the Roman Catholic 
Church and European Jewish Leaders has been reached and ratified in Geneva in1987, 
asking the nuns to move their convent from Auschwitz by 1989.  The move did not 
happen and a visit by a Rabbi with a group of Jews from New York lead to another 
clash at the site when the Rabbi staged a protest, which eventually culminated in 
confrontation with Pope John Paul II, leaving the pope perplexed and the local Jewish 
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community apologizing for the Rabbi. The protest took place in July 1989, “roughly 
coinciding with the fall of Communism in Poland.  Many Poles perceived the pressures 
from outside Poland to relocate the convent as an insult and a threat to, or even an 
assault on, their state’s newly regained and still fragile sovereignty” (Zubrzycki, 2006, 
p. 6). The nuns eventually relocated in 1993 after the pope’s personal intervention.  A 
year before the 1989 cross controversy,  
a tall cross appeared on the ground of the convent, the so-called gravel pit. 
Brought there by a local priest and a group of former (Polish Catholic) 
Auschwitz prisoners, the cross had been part of an altar on the grounds of 
Birkenau, Auschwitz’s sister camp three kilometers away, where John Paul II 
celebrated Mass in 1979 during his historic visit to Poland as pontiff—hence its 
popular naming as the papal cross.  (Zubrzycki, 2006, p. 7) 
 
The cross had been stored in a basement for almost a decade, before being erected in the 
convent’s yard, without witnesses and without any kind of public ceremony. The label 
“papal” cross had been contested by Father Musiał since there was no proof of the 
pontiff actually blessing the cross or establishing the gravel pit as the adequate site for 
the cross (Zubrzycki, 2006).  Since the label has been used in public discourse, I will 
follow Zubrzycki’s lead and use it as well, omitting the quotation marks from this point 
forward while reserving the status of contestation.  
 The cross controversy culminated in a third incident, taking place in February 
1998, when “Krzysztof Śliwiński, plenipotentiary to the foreign affairs minister and 
responsible for contacts with the Jewish Diaspora, mentioned in an interview...that the 
papal cross...would also be removed from the grounds of the former Carmelite convent“ 
(Zubrzycki, 2006, p. 8).  This statement elicited strong reactions from several political 
figures, including Lech Wałęsa, who insisted that the cross shall not be removed.  The 
issue gained national attention, leading up to a hunger strike by Kazimierz Świtoń, who 
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used to be a Solidarity activist as well as deputy from the “right-wing Confederation for 
an Independent Poland” (p. 9).  The strike lasted forty-two days, staged at the gravel pit.  
When the Roman Catholic Church did not commit to his demands to leaving the cross 
where it was, he instigated the planting of 152 crosses by fellow Poles, “both to 
commemorate the (documented) deaths of 152 ethnic Poles executed by that specific 
site by Nazis in 1941 and to ‘protect and defend the papal cross’” (p. 10).  His appeal 
was successful and the symbolism not only mobilized Poles from all over the country, 
as well as fellow “defenders of the cross” from the United States, Canada, and 
Australia, to plant those 152 crosses.  The appeal exceeded Świtoń’s expectations when 
over the course of several months the number of crosses rose to 332 in May 1999; at 
that point the Polish army intervened and removed them. 
 Here, once again, a semiotic landscape has been transformed by juxtaposing 
competing symbols of national memory.  In a short amount of time,  
religious images of the national Madonna (Our Lady of Częstochowa), as well 
as secular symbols such as red-and-white Polish flags and national coats of arms 
featuring a crowned white eagle, commonly adorned the crosses and added to 
their symbolic weight and complexity.  (Zubrzycki, 2006, p. 10) 
 
Disobedience of Catholics of the episcopate has manifested itself in masses held at 
camp site, surrounded by crosses (see Figure 1).  The “war of crosses” put the 
government in a strange situation regarding the expectations of its involvement.  Based 
on the concordat of 1997, the government initially insisted on the separation of church 
and state and assigning the responsibility to the Roman Catholic Church since the papal 
cross was its property.  The church, on the other hand, argued that the crosses were 
planted on government property “and that the church had no monopoly on the  
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Figure 1. Mass celebrated outside the gravel pit in September 1998. Photo: PAP/Roman Koszowski 
 
symbol of the cross, which belonged to the entire community of believers” (p. 13).  
Eventually, following many debated and legal battles, a solution was reached to remove 
the crosses and evict Świtoń from the gravel pit.  All of the crosses were removed, 
except for the papal cross (Figure 2) since there was “no resolution of the initial conflict 
concerning the presence of that specific cross” (p. 14).   
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Figure 2. Papal cross in Auschwitz. Photo: Signalhead 
 
 In the end, the papal cross has become a symbol of the tensions surrounding the 
conflict between competing national memories, signifying a monument of dispute. As 
Zubrzycki (2006) notes, the papal cross now serves as   
a reminder of the conflict, a scar on the ground, a polluting emblem in a taboo 
zone—the protection zone around the former camp, a legal and symbolic buffer 
between the sacred and the profane, between Auschwitz and the town of 
Oświęcim (p. 14).   
The cross as a mythic symbol is powerful, both literally and figuratively, because, to the 
linguistic community that shares the understanding of the code of Polishness and 
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Catholicism, it is not an arbitrary symbol.  Although it does fall into the magic 
spectrum, the association of the cross with the martyred nation that was put on the 
cross, just like Christ, is a powerful enough myth to stir emotions and cause 
controversy.   
The time of the controversy played important role in the interpretation and 
reinterpretation of the Polish nation as a martyr.  Since the incidents took place post 
1989 and Poland was free from the colonizing power of the Soviet system, 
“‘Oświęcim,’ the symbol of Polish martyrdom, was overshadowed by “Auschwitz,’ the 
international epicenter of Holocaust memory-making” (p. 16).  So, in addition to the 
controversy being a clash between representatives of two groups whose martyr 
identities are tied to the “messianic myths of chosenness” (p. 16), the events were also 
indicative of idea and interpretation of the Polish nation in a post-communist context 
and its relations with the Catholic Church (Zubrzycki, 2006).  
 A triadic relationship between state, nation, and religion, per Zubrzycki’s (2006) 
suggestion, does seem to be a stable construct, which has been exemplified once more 
during a contention involving yet another cross following the crash of the presidential 
plane on April 10
th
, 2010 in Smolensk, western Russia.  The plane crash killed 96 
dignitaries, including the Polish president Lech Kaczyński and his wife, who were 
aboard the Polish Air Force TU-154.   The symbolism of the crash and the aftermath is 
multi-faceted (fig. 3).  The victims were en route to a ceremony commemorating the 
70
th
 anniversary of the Katyń massacre, where more than 22,000 Poles were killed 
through a shot in the back of the head by the Soviet secret police in 1940.   
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Although conspiracy theories still persist regarding the cause of the crash, 
especially with the new developments Ukraine and Russia following the re-annexation 
of the historically contested Crimea, the investigation has concluded that it was an error 
commited by the Polish pilots as well as the Russian air traffic controllers during the 
landing procedure in dense fog.  The conspiracy theories are not surprising given the 
emotionally charged context of the crash.  In a scenario where members of the Polish 
elite are being killed in Smolensk, Russia, while on their way to commemorate anothor 
group of Polish elite members who were mass executed 70 years prior, in Katyń, about 
20 kilometers (12 miles) west of Smolensk, the nationalist russophobe mind is being fed 
the continous idea of the persecuted nation.  The aftermath of the crash, in addition to 
the disputed process of investigation, has once more sedimented Poland’s identity in 
opposition to their historic other, Russia.  The reaction was not uniform and the 
conspiracy theories are mostly supported by the more conservative part of Poland’s 
population, but that part is large enough to keep the debate alive.   
Regardless of the cause for the tragedy, it still is a national tragedy that has been 
memorialized with a lot of patriotic pathos.  The first memorial service took place in the 
forest of Smolensk (called the “forest of death”) and presented a powerful image of an 
unintended double commemoration, with rows of empty chairs, a small Polish flag and 
an umbrella hung on each of the empty chairs that were meant for the guests of honor 
who never arrived (fig. 3).  If one were to take the conspiracy theories further, 
mythologizing the experience of the tragedy that goes along with this image, it might 
imply that those chairs were meant to remain empty.  Emotional responses to national 
tragedies at times include looking for an explanation to understand the meaning of what 
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happened.  When a national tragedy happens to a nation that has a long history of 
persecution and that has developed its identity through those memories, some of them 
more mythologized than others, a mythic consciousness might offer solace but it also 
can lead to hermeneutic horizon with no way out.  Mythic consciousness can help to 
survive a tragedy, it can motivate and mobilize a collective toward social change, but it 
can also cause harm when powerful symbols are used for nationalistic purposes.   
 
Figure 3. Memorial service after plane crash in Smolensk. Photo: Grzegorz Jakublowski/European 
Pressphoto Agency 
 
 The tragedy has unfortunately invited some nationalist responses that have been 
fueled by the conspiracy theories, as Katyn is a deep would in Poland’s memory.  
During the Communist era, Katyn was not supposed to be mentioned in public because 
at that time the official Soviet version of the massacre was that the Nazis were the 
perpetrators.  Hence, the wound has been festering for decades and it found a partial 
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outlet after the tragedy happened.  The nationalist discourse led by the late president’s 
supporters was sparked by right wing-politicians and by the deceased president’s twin 
brother Jarosław Kaczyński.  The discourse referred to the plane crash as a “second 
Katyn” and the country was divided in those who believed that it was an accident and 
those who were convinced it was an assassination (Domoslawski, November 2013).  
The paranoia embedded in the conspiracy theories resulted in Poland’s liberal 
intelligentsia coining the term “Smolensk religion”.  According to Polish journalist 
Domoslawski (November 2013), the doctrine of the “Smolensk religion” was “a 
singular, explosive mixture of Polish messianism and religious fundamentalism, 
xenophobia and  a love of martyrdom.  For followers of the faith, any rational argument 
about the crash was instantly transubstantiated into further proof of the assassins’ 
cunning” (para 8).  Critics of this type of nationalist discourse in Poland take examples 
such as the “Smolensk religion” to be Poland’s problem with the idea of a modern 
outlook and liberal democracy, which has been embraced much more willingly when 
the government changed hands after the plane crash in 2010.  
To return to the discussion of the cross as a Polish national symbol, the more 
recent “cross controversy” took place in front of the presidential palace in Warsaw (Fig. 
4).  After the crash, supporters of the late president have decorated the space in front of 
the palace with various items, including images of Pope John Paul II, Our Lady of 
Częstochowa as well other religious symbols, and a four meter or 13 feet high cross, 
making it into a shrine for the deceased (Deboick, 2010; Dempsey, 2010).  The author 
of this study has been visiting her relatives in Wrocław, Poland, at the time of the cross 
controversy.  On the day when the cross was supposed to be removed by authorities to 
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St. Anne’s, a church nearby, and the removal was nationally broadcast, live, the self-
proclaimed “Defenders of the Cross” were staging a protest that prevented the removal 
of the cross that day.  The live broadcast was eventually cancelled and debates 
intensified.   
 
Figure 4. Cross and memorabilia in front of Presidential Palace in Warsaw. Photo: Tomasz 
Gzell/European Pressphoto Agency 
 
For about a month, the Defenders of the Cross were holding a vigil around the 
cross to prevent another removal attempt.  However, the position held by the Defenders 
of the Cross was not representative of the majority of Poles.  Another group, Akcja 
Krzyż (Cross Action), emerged and actively engaged in an effort to remove the cross.  
This group consisted of mostly young liberal-minded atheists and secularists who 
opposed the display of a religious symbol in front of the seat of the government.  An 
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interesting shift has been occurring within Poland post 1989.  As the event of the 2010 
cross controversy shows, in “the equating of Katyn and Smolensk, historical specificity 
is erased to make universal symbols of Polish suffering, and at this shrine Catholicism 
was articulated as the essence of Poland's history and nationhood”, but a growing 
number of liberal secularists, particularly among the younger Poles is distancing 
themselves from religious forms of nationalism (Deboick, 2010).  What that means for 
other forms of nationalism remains to be seen.  
Adopting Zubrzycki’s perspective, which was influenced by Sewell (1999) and 
his view of cultures, the author of this study thinks of culture “as a network of semiotic 
relations that has a certain coherence” and agrees that  
[t]his coherence…is “thin” at best: users of culture form a semiotic community 
in that they recognize the meaning of signs and symbols and are able to engage 
in meaningful action, but without necessarily agreeing in their emotional or 
moral evaluations of these recognized symbols.  (Zubrzycki, 2006, p. 26) 
This perspective moves away from a more static system of symbols and meanings and 
lends itself for the study of nationalism, especially when the idea of a nation is 
considered a work in progress, an idea to which both Billig (1995) and Zubrzycki 
(2006) subscribe.  Relating back to the semiotic spectrum of the cross, “all Poles, 
regardless of religious affiliation and level of commitment, recognize the cross as a key 
Polish symbol; not all, however, agree on its meaning and place in Polish society” 
(Zubrzycki, 2006, pp. 26-27).  This author’s emphasis on the mobilizing power of 
emotions is also part of Zubrzycki’s approach to interpreting the symbolism of the 
cross: “As a Christian symbol, the cross summons sentiments related to suffering and 
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martyrdom, but also of hope and renewal,” furthermore, “in its more specifically 
national dimension, it arouses feelings of pride in Polish national identity and 
independence—conjoining connotations of both the oppression from, and resistance to, 
foreigners” (p. 28).   
 Both controversies, although more than a decade apart, show parallels in 
symbolic expressions of identity and in both cases binary oppositions are in place.  The 
semiotic landscape signified as “Polish,” claimed by Poles versus “non-Poles” (Jews); 
“real Poles” (Deboick, 2010) versus “un-faithful” Poles (atheists and secularists); 
Defenders of the Cross who “sacralized” the camp site/memorial versus those who 
insisted on the “profane” removal of the cross.  In both cases of polarization it was the 
“Other” from within, which is an indication of the power of the mythic cross and its 
stable position as a national symbol in Poland.     
The Cult of the Black Madonna 
The Black Madonna’s role as a national symbol has briefly been mentioned in 
the discussion of Poland’s mythic designation as the Christ of nations.  Images of the 
Black Madonna can be found around the world, in different manifestations.  In Poland, 
the Częstochowa rendition is only one of hundreds of icons of the Madonna displayed 
in different regions of the country.  Oleszkiewicz-Peralba (2007) studied the different 
traditions and transformations of the Black Madonna in Latin America and Europe and 
described the “migration” of Madonna sanctuaries to the United States. 
When Poles emigrated to distant lands, they took the Madonna with them and 
often established new sanctuaries, such as the Black Madonna of Częstochowa 
Shrine and Grottos in Eureka, Missouri; in Doylestown, Pennsylvania; and in 
Czestochowa, Texas.  Significantly, the town of Panna Maria (Virgin Mary), 
near San Antonio, Texas, dedicated to the Black Madonna of Częstochowa, was 
the first Polish settlement in the United States (1854).  A grotto dedicated to Our 
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Lady of Częstochowa was built in San Antonio in 1966 to commemorate the 
Polish millennium of Christianity (966-1966).  (p. 3) 
 
Oleszkiewicz-Peralba (2007) describes ancient and modern incarnations of the Black 
Madonna, pointing out that her popularity can be attributed to her “uniting and 
equalizing function on a social and national level” that renders gender, race, class, and 
ethnic origin as foundations of strength and not obstacles (p. 11).  She points out the 
transformation of the Black Madonna in the Christian tradition, namely that the 
“Christian Mary inherited the tradition of her powerful female predecessors, although 
she was gradually stripped of some of her powers, such as her dominion over life and 
death, her wisdom, and her sexuality.” (p. 16).  This observation is congruent with the 
patriarchal nature of Christianity in general, which is beyond the scope of this study and 
a topic for another time. 
 In her survey regarding the origins of the traditions linked to the iconicity of the 
Black Madonna, Oleszkiewicz-Peralba (2007) comments that many Christian symbols 
and narratives can be traced back to pagan roots, presenting Christianity as “a good 
example of the syncretic processes, as it has absorbed a gamut of preexistent beliefs and 
practices, incorporating them into its symbols and rituals.  The Virgin Mary, Mother of 
God, is a clear example of syncretism” (pp. 16-18).  She applies the syncretic processes 
to the Polish Black Madonna of Częstochowa who presents a certain kind of 
syncretism:  “She is a Byzantine painting of a Black Madonna holding a child, of the 
type called Hodegetria, or ‘Indicator of the Way,’ dating from the sixth—ninth century” 
(p. 18).  The worship of the Black Madonna began in 1384, when the painting was 
brought to the Pauline monastery at Jasna Góra, located in Częstochowa, Poland.  The 
icon has been perceived as miraculous, one of the most famous “miracles” includes 
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saving Poland from the Swedish invasion in 1655, referred to as Potop, or the Swedish 
Deluge.  The idea of miracles performed by Marian figures, such as apparitions and 
sightings of the Mary weeping and producing actual tears, is deeply rooted in a magic 
consciousness.  People who claim to experience these things seem to genuinely believe 
that they did see a miracle and that they did see the Mother of God crying real tears.  
Such interpretations would not be possible from a modern perspective who has a much 
more dissociated worldview.   
The Black Madonna has also been experienced through a mythic conscousness.  
Some of the myths surrounding the landscape in Częstochowa county show yet another 
example of binary oppositions that contribute to the construction of national symbols in 
Poland. For instance, 
[a]ccording to a widespread legend, ‘Łysiec,’ or ‘Bold Mountain,’ is the place of 
witches’ Sabbaths.  This presumed darkness is countered by the nearby Jasna 
Góra, or ‘Bright’ (meaning holy) Mountain, where the sanctuary of the most 
venerated Polish icon, ironically the Black Madonna of Częstochowa, is located.  
(Oleszkiewicz-Peralba, 2007, p. 32) 
 
The juxtaposition of dark and bright, profane and sacred, evil and good provides an 
important contrast in Christian symbolism, which in this case is adapted to Polish 
messianic national identity.  The name of the location, Jasna Góra signifies a symbolic 
pedestal for the Black Madonna, also referred to as Jasna Panna (Radiant Virgin).  The 
emphasis on this brightness and radiance in those names is mirrored in visual 
manifestations of the Catholic Church.  The pope’s robes are all white, for instance.  
The color white has a connotation of purity, innocence, and good, which in the case of 
the symbolic expressions of the Catholic Church, be it names or clothes, can be 
interpreted as proximity to god and heaven.  In the case of the Jasna Panna, the name 
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implies both, purity and closeness to the divine.  The color black in the case of the 
Black Madonna has invited various explanations; mostly that it was a result of age, 
which seems to be the case for some of the black madonnas, but not all of them.  Moss 
and Capannari (1953) offered their hypothesis: “The black madonnas are Christian 
borrowings from earlier pagan art forms which depicted Ceres, Demeter, or Isis as black 
in the color characteristic of these goddesses of the earth”, they continue, “[a]long this 
line, in 1335 a prior at the Chalis Monastery…noted that Mary represents the earth, 
which is the body and darkness.  Hence, Mary being of the earth, can rightfully act as 
celestial attorney for all earthly sinners” (p. 324). Christian signifieds have usually been 
superimposed on pagan art forms, the roots of many of today’s Christian symbols.         
 The image of the Madonna is also linked to that of a fertile and nourishing 
Mother Earth, the source who gives and takes life. As Oleszkiewicz-Peralba (2007) 
notes    
[t]he cult of Mother Earth as the origin of all creation goes back to matriarchal 
times and manifests itself in such goddesses as Prythiwi, Isis, Ishtar, Cybele, 
Ceres, Aphrodite, Venus, and Freya.  In fact, Adam, the first man, according to 
Judeo-Christian tradition, was formed out of clay, and his name is derived from 
adamah—earth (Heb.).  (p. 34) 
 
Furthermore, “[i]n Polish popular religiosity and apocryphal writings, where the sacrum 
and the profanum are parts of the same reality, the Mother of God is a protectress and a 
creator or a cocreator of the world” (Oleszkiewicz-Peralba , 2007, p. 37).  In the Polish 
narrative, Mary has played several symbolic mother roles, including that of  
one’s own mother, family, motherland, and the state” being called “Matka Polka 
and Matka Polska, indicating that she is Mother Pole and Mother Poland.  In her 
name, and under her protection, numerous private and public battles for 
independence from foreign and internal oppression took place” (p. 39).   
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The author of this study has vivid recollections of the term “Matka Polka” being 
used when referring to women in her family who are mothers, mostly when everyday 
challenges were tangible.  According to a personal interview Oleszkiewicz-Peralba 
conducted with Danuta Olbryś,  
[t]he term Matka Polka symbolizes the qualities of fortitude, bravery, devotion, 
sacrifice, and heroism of Polish women who had to take care of family and 
society while their husbands were fighting for the freedom of Poland on the 
battlefield, or when they were deported to Siberia from the eighteenth-century 
partitions of Poland through the First and Second World Wars.  (p. 173, Note 
51) 
 
In the author’s experience, those qualities were also implied when the term Matka Polka 
was used at her home, applying less to the absence of husbands, but more to the context 
of living in a communist society at the time which required its own set of sacrifices 
from women. 
 The cult of Mary does have little basis in the New Testament and it only 
emerges in the fifth century of the Christian Church.  What distinguishes the Roman 
Catholic Church most from other Christian churches is its emphasis upon Mary 
(Carroll, 1986).  Returning to the image of the Mother of God, specifically Our Lady of 
Częstochowa (fig. 5), whose wound in the form of three saber lines on her left cheek 
“may be seen as symbolic of the abused feminine, parallels the injuries inflicted on the 
Polish people and motherland” (Oleszkiewicz-Peralba, 2007, p. 39).  The painting has 
been desecrated by infidel plunderers in 1430, which is a possible explanation for the 
wounds, which “are also a symbolic reflection of the wounds of Christ” (p. 40).  The 
signification of the Marian figure as a symbol of courage has been displayed in 
contemporary contexts, such as the Solidarity movement where the image of the Black 
Madonna “was worn on lapels, standards, and guidons and used as a stamp for 
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Solidarity correspondence” and “political prisoners elaborated her image on towels, in 
the same way that Chicano/a and Mexican prisoners in the United States and Mexico 
paint the Virgin of Guadalupe in their arte de pano” (p. 43).  
 The Black Madonna embodies many roles in the realm of magic consciousness: 
Queen of Poland, Mother of God, Mother of the Polish nation.  To this day, Mary is 
among the most venerated religious figures and symbols of Polish devotion, and Our 
Lady of Częstochowa the most prominent physical manifestation, attracting large 
groups of pilgrims to Jasna Góra every year (Maniura, 2004).  And although it is not “a 
collective representation of Polish society, it is the most sacred symbol in the Polish 
ethos, the ubiquitous reminder of the Marian tenor of Polish Catholicism” (Kubik, 1994, 
p. 108).  An example of mythic consciousness can be observed during the Pope John 
Paul II’s speech while he was visiting Poland for the first time as pontiff.  He 
punctuated his visit of Jasna Góra with the following words: 
Jasna Góra is not only a place of pilgrimage for Poles from Poland and the rest 
of the world.  Jasna Góra is the sanctuary of the nation….Polish history, 
particularly of the last centuries, can be written in many different ways, there are 
many keys to its interpretation.  Yet if we want to know how this history flows 
through Polish hearts, it is necessary to come here.  It is necessary to put one’s 
ear to this Place.  It is necessary to hear an echo of the Nation’s life in the Heart 
of Its Queen and Mother.  (as cited quoted in Kubik, 1994, p. 108, [emphasis 
added]) 
 
He is describing the heart as well as hearing, referring to the sound of the heartbeat of 
Poland, which is how myth is expressed.  
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Figure 5. Our Lady of Częstochowa, Jasna Góra, Poland. Icon dating from sixth to ninth century A.D. 
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Apart from the color black, the aesthetic of the Madonna has acquired another 
layer of symbolic meaning through the process of restoration.  The assumption is, that 
after the restoration “commissioned by Władysław Jagiełło and executed by Italian 
masters, the image acquired a new quality” since its “original , schematic flatness, 
Characteristic of Eastern icons, was enriched by the roundness and softness of an Italian 
school” (Kubik, 1994, p. 109).  This fusion of artistic styles, where the uniqueness of 
the painting meets the “soft magic” has been offered as possible explanation for to the 
icon’s popularity (Kubik, 1994, p. 109).  Additionally, Kubik suggests that the symbolic 
level of the double aesthetic quality can potentially be interpreted as through Poland’s 
existence between the East and the West. 
Poles have, throughout the centuries, thought of their country as a place where 
the Western and Eastern civilizations and cultural currents merged.  Perhaps this 
explains—at least partially—the enormous popularity of a painting that 
somehow epitomizes this stereotype of the dual nature of Polish culture.  (p. 
109) 
 
The Black Madonna as a national symbol represents several qualities that are ingrained 
into the mythic idea of the Polish nation.  The universal idea of a nurturing and 
protecting mother figure represents a strong value in Poland.  Mothers are perceived 
with a lot of respect and are often times called sacred, which is something this author 
has witnessed and embraced while interacting with her own mother.  She has also 
witnessed a very different way of interacting between mothers and their children while 
growing up in Germany.  In conversations with her younger sister, who grew up in 
Germany since the age of three, the author noticed different ways parents, and 
especially mothers, were treated (i.e., sometimes being called by their first name; 
perceived more as equals/friends by their children).  The main difference that stood out 
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is precisely the image of the sacred mother, which does not mean that one can only 
convey respect when perceiving a mother as sacred, but this particular notion explains 
why the Marian devotion seems to have a stronger hold in cultures that live in closely 
knit families, such as Italy, Spain, and Poland.   
Culture and religion are inextricably tied to each other and in order to 
understand the symbols that emerge out of that relationship one needs to be part of the 
linguistic community.  The principle of ingroup and outgroup plays an important role 
here.  To an outsider who visits the shrine in Częstochowa, the icon does not convey the 
same emotional identification as it does to a Catholic from Poland.  The outsider may or 
may not appreciate the icon as a piece of art and be curious about its history, but that is 
a dissociated stance.  To the insider, embarking on a pilgrimage to Jasna Góra and being 
allowed to view the Black Madonna during specific windows of time, before the shrine 
is closed again for the day, that is an entirely different experience.  Why do Muslims 
travel to the Holy City of Mecca?  For the same reasons Catholics go to Częstochowa, 
for the magical experience.  It would not make sense for a Catholic to go to Mecca, just 
as a Muslim would not join the pilgrimage to Jasna Góra (the Paulinian monastery 
being the symbolic center of Catholic Poland) or to Vatican City.  If I do not share a 
particular code, a symbol system, I become a mere dissociated spectator who does not 
understand the signs and symbols of that code and thus remains an outsider.  The insider 
is not only looking at a painting, the insider is part of the Black Madonna and 
participates in the immediacy of the magic. Whereas the outsider just looks on.   
Although the goal for most religiously devoted Poles is to participate in a 
pilgrimage and to witness the original icon of the Black Madonna, there are also 
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processions for the Black Madonna with copies of the icon (Figure 7), visiting different 
locations throughout the country.  In this particular photograph, the women carrying one 
such copy are wearing traditional Polish costumes; the copy of the icon is in a frame 
adorned with leaves, sitting on the women’s shoulders; following the women are 
children and priests.  The women in traditional costumes evoke the image of traditional 
values of the motherland, the Matka Polka, the queen mother sitting on their shoulders 
and protectively overlooking her land, her Poland.  Such processions function as a 
reminder of the association between Polishness and Catholicism, reinforcing the role of 
the Catholic Church.  It is also important to note here that these processions and parades 
usually target smaller towns, where the population is much more devoted to the church.  
It was in the church’s interest to intensify the symbiosis between Catholicism and 
Polishness, and between church and civil society.  That symbiosis is quite clearly part of 
the Catholic Church’s political agenda until this day, which is received with mixed 
reactions, especially by the more secularly and liberally minded part of the population 
as evidenced by the cross controversy in 2010 discussed earlier.  
 Another manifestation of the powerful symbolism of the Black Madonna has 
been exemplified through an experience during the celebrations of the millennium (966-
1966), when Polish citizens repeatedly clashed with the state police  
On the day when the icon was to come to Olsztyn, workers were kept at the 
factories until seven in the evening and students of the agricultural school were 
explicitly forbidden to take part in the festivities.  In any case, the icon never 
arrived in Olsztyn: the police stopped it on the road and directed it to Frombork.  
After celebrations in that town, the icon was to travel to Warsaw, but a few 
kilometers outside Frombork, motorized police stopped the motorcade in which 
the Primate and the icon were riding, seized the painting, and took it away, to 
what destination no one could guess.  (Micewski, 1984, p. 269, as cited in 
Kubik, 1994, p. 116) 
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Later on, it was found that the police secretly took the icon to the Warsaw Cathedral in 
order to sabotage the welcome ceremonies that were supposed to be hosted by two 
parishes.  The icon “was forcefully detained for three months in the Warsaw Cathedral, 
and then for six years…in a side chapel on Jasna Góra” (p. 116).  However, that did not 
stop the pilgrimage and the  
icon’s empty frame, sometimes adorned with flowers, sometimes with a burning 
candle or a Bible inside, continued its tour and visited four southern and two 
eastern dioceses.  The perils and power of religion in Communist Poland came 
to be symbolized by the vacant frame.  (p. 116, emphasis added) 
 
This event magnifies the idea of an emotional identification and of the affective power 
of a national symbol even in its absence.  It does not have to be perceived with eyes 
(sight being an element of the perspectival worldview) in order to carry meaning.  Eco 
(2004) comments on the power of an absent symbol: 
The ambiguity of symbols comes from distant roots and is justified not only by 
the etymology of “symballein” but by the very practice its etymology denotes.  
For one could easily say of those two matching pieces of token that they will be 
seamlessly put together again the day someone places them in the presence of 
each other and makes them fit together, removing them from the free flow of 
semiosis and turning each of them once more into a thing in the world of things; 
and yet what is so fascinating about each of the two separated elements is the 
very absence of the other, for it is only on absence and in absence that the most 
overpowering passions thrive.  (p. 141, emphasis added) 
 
The event of the Polish nation without a state during the partitions, and the procession 
of the frame without the icon during the millennial celebration of the Polish state, 
indicate parallels that are characteristic of Poland’s identity and the Polish response to 
colonizing powers.  During crises, the national symbols were crucial for the survival for 
the Polish nation.    
 In addition to the image of the mother and the power of the absent symbol, the 
Black Madonna has also been turned into a royal figure, beginning in 1653 when the 
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Pauline monks in Częstochowa fought back the Swedish invaders.  In symbolic gesture 
of gratitude, King Jan Kazimierz “dedicated Poland to the Virgin Mary and consecrated 
the icon as ‘Queen of Poland.’  It is probably from the king’s vows of faithfulness to the 
Virgin that Poland’s traditional motto, Polonia semper fidelis, originates” (Zubrzycki, 
2006, p. 41).  In 1956, Cardinal Wyszyński re-dedicated the Polish nation to the Queen 
of Poland, while repeating the king’s vows from three hundred years ago.  He used 
those same words when welcoming the pope in his first visit in Poland, who in turn 
used those words as well.  The painting in the shrine has a cover that includes a crown 
(fig. 6).  The royal symbolism, although to a lesser degree, has been applied to the pope 
as well who has been called Poland’s king.  Furthermore, Poland’s coat of arms, the 
White Eagle, is depicted with a crown.  That crown was removed during the communist 
regime and put back as soon as the regime was overthrown.  These overlapping 
semiotic qualities of Jasna Góra, the Madonna, the pope, the White Eagle, and the royal 
attributes, have all contributed to Poland’s national identity.   
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Figure 6. Our Lady of Częstochowa, Jasna Góra, Poland. Icon with crown and cover inside sanctuary. 
Photo: EAST NEWS 
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Figure 7. Procession for the Black Madonna of Częstochowa in the southern town of Poronin, Poland, 
1991. Copies of sacred icons travel across the country visiting different locations. Photo: Małgorzata 
Oleszkiewicz Peralba 
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The Contested Landscape of the National Stadium 
Warsaw’s semiotic landscape presents an interesting case for the study of 
national symbols.  The capital of Poland has undergone many transformations in the 
past, but what makes it an interesting case is that it has not stopped transforming.  This 
continuous process of transforming and never really being can be observed in various 
areas of the city.  
Uncomfortably positioned between “polluted” East and mythical “West”, 
escaping the “second world” without quite reaching the “first”, proud of its 
dynamism, but nostalgically dreaming to be at last “done”, Warsaw seems 
reluctant to fully re-invent its identity around the strategic uniqueness of an 
idiosyncratic borderland city, and re-orient its self-perception accordingly.  It is 
also unsure about fully allowing a creative, bottom-up use of the developmental 
chaos it is unable to conquer with traditional means, and too risk-averse to add 
purely cultural components to the business plans of its most prominent projects 
geared toward the post-industrial revitalization of its historical places. 
(Bartmański, 2012, p. 151) 
 
One example of the transformative process is the story of the two stadiums.  The 
National Stadium (Stadion Narodowy) was built where once the 10
th
-Anniversary 
Stadium (Stadion Dziesięciolecia) used to be, on the right bank of the Vistula (Wisła) 
river in the Praga district, opposite the city center.  The former stadium has been 
demolished in 2008 to make space for the new one, the site for the events of UEFA 
European Football Championship, commonly referred to as Euro 2012 (Cope, 2010).  
The former stadium has had a rich history, its foundation consisted of the debris form 
World War II when 80% of the buildings in the city were destroyed.  The new stadium 
has been built on that very same foundation, preserving its historical significance.  The 
name, 10th-Anniversary Stadium, referred to Poland’s tenth anniversary as a political 
state, the communist People’s Republic of Poland; thus the opening of the stadium in 
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1955.  Several events took place in the 10th-Anniversary Stadium that had historical 
national and international significance (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Aerial view of the 10
th
 Anniversary Stadium in the panorama of Warsaw: Photo: Marek 
Ostrowski/semper.pl 
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Sulima (2012) mentions several of those events that took place at the 10
th
 
Anniversary Stadium in his ethnographic report, discussing some of the semantic 
transformations that took place in the public space in Warsaw and focusing on the 
specific transformation of the stadium over time. 
In the public opinion the Stadium is associated with a series of events eagerly 
reconstructed by the media: 1955—the Second International Youth Festival; 
1956—the legendary victory of Stanisław Królak (over the Soviet cyclists) in 
the Peace Race; 1958—the athletics match between Poland and the USA; 
1968—the self-immolation of Ryszard Siwiec as an act of protest against the 
military intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia; 1983—the Mass 
celebrated by Pope John Paul II during his second pilgrimage to Poland; 1987—
the last football match played at this stadium, a match between Poland and 
Finland.  (Sulima, 2012, p. 246) 
Once the stadium started to deteriorate and the city eventually stopped hosting events 
and games, it was abandoned and stood empty for a few years.  In 1989, in exchange for 
the maintenance of the facility, the city of Warsaw leased the stadium to a company 
named Damis for commercial purposes and Jarmark Europa (Europe Bazaar) was born 
(Figure 9).  The bazaar was set up in the crown of the stadium and was composed of 
more than 5,000 businesses, thus becoming one of the largest markets in Europe.  The 
site of the stadium has offered a multi-faceted picture over the years of its existence, 
being described as a “mix of Socialist mausoleum, Aztec temple, and bunker system 
with a network of small gardens, along with a grid structure of endless market stalls” 
(Miller, 2009, laura-palmer.pl).  The bazaar began with Vietnamese and Russian 
traders; the Vietnamese are the largest minority in Warsaw and the bazaar had mostly 
been operated by students and other educated Vietnamese citizens.  Over time, 
representatives of other nationalities and ethnicities traveled to Warsaw and opened 
their market stalls. 
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Although the bazaar might have appeared chaotic, there was a clear organization 
of space between the different national groups.  The northern sector of the stadium was 
governed by the Vietnamese and the Lithuanians; the eastern sector was occupied by 
Chechens and Georgians; the southern sector was occupied by Russians and Ukrainians; 
and the crown of the stadium was dominated by Armenians (Kudzia & Pawelczyk, 
2001).  Operating hours of this grey-market were between 3:00am and 12:00pm and one 
could acquire everything, from pirated CDs, fake designer clothing, and shoelaces, to 
drugs and guns.  Sulima (2012) asserted,  
the presence of a bazaar on the premises of the 10
th
-Anniversar Stadium should 
not be seen as something incidental or relict, but rather a forecast of something 
new and not yet recognized, something that disturbs our set patterns of thought 
on the city, ‘the Other’ and the ways of cultural auto-identification. (p. 241) 
 
Jarmark Europa stood out as a multicultural site in an otherwise ethnically homogenous 
Warsaw and at the end of its existence it inspired a series of art projects that culminated 
in “The Finissage of Stadium X” organized by the Laura Palmer Foundation, an 
independent arts organization based in Warsaw.  The art projects focused on several 
events that took place at the stadium that became the stage for some of Poland’s history.  
One of the epochal moments happened when the stadium was still alive as a stadium, on 
September 8
th, 1968.  As Władysław Gomułka, a communist party leader, was speaking 
on stage before 100,000 people, a father of five, Ryszard Siwiec doused himself in 
petrol and lit a match.  His self-immolation was a protest of the use of Polish troops in 
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia a month prior to the event, and although seven 
seconds of his action had been recorded by a Polish news crew, the video had been 
suppressed and kept an official secret until 1980.  The video can be currently found in 
two versions on YouTube, one of the two versions includes Catholic funeral music and 
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showing and image of Siwiec as a holy ghost at the end of the video, depicted as 
another national victim, joining the myth of martyrdom.  
 
 
Figure 9. Jarmark Europa (“Stadium-Bazaar”). Photo: Wojciech Traczyk 
 
Another epochal moment was in 1983, fifteen years after Siwiec’s self-
immolation and six years before the bazaar came into being, when Pope John Paul II 
visited Poland for the second time since becoming pope and delivered a mass at the 
stadium.  This time there were no instructions for the camera operators who were 
filming the event to only point their lenses on nuns and the elderly.  The stadium was 
filled with people of all ages, eager to see the pope and hear his message.  The pope 
used the stadium clock as an altar and planted a crucifix on the crown of the stadium, 
which remained there following his departure.   
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The heaviness of the symbolic act from 1968 stands in contrast to the rather 
joyous event in 1983.  Both carry a mix of magic and mythic signification based in 
Poland’s past and its national identity.  The drastic display of sacrificial symbolism in 
the act of self-immolation and the pope’s mass held on the pile of bones of the 
insurgents, praying underneath a cross, are examples of the culture of resistance 
mentioned at the beginning of this study.  This resistance can be explained through the 
strong hold of the magic and mythic consciousness structures.  Although Polish society 
as a whole does not exemplify a community that is rooted in magic consciousness, its 
fate throughout history is interspersed with events that demonstrate the reach of magic 
consciousness, eventually progressing into a mythic consciousness.   
Not only are the two stadiums the more obvious symbols of the Polish nation, 
but the cross, once again, enters the stage the national symbol.  It once again made its 
way back onto the stage, signifying Poland as the crucified nation, as the Christ of 
nations; thus continuing the myth.  In 1983 the Solidarity movement was gaining 
momentum, which was tangible as well during that mass and the dialed down media 
censorship, allowing for a more open broadcast.  It was also tangible due the fact that 
during the mass the pope was talking about the 1683 Battle of Vienna, commemorating 
a victory of the Holy League, consisting of the Holy Roman Empire in league with the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, against the Ottoman Empire.  Commemorating an 
event that overthrew another empire and evoking national identity, while being 
suppressed by the Soviet empire, contributed once more to the legitimization of Poland 
as a nation and strengthened the myth of resurrection.   
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The contestation of the semiotic landscape during the time period when Jarmark 
Europa was nearing its end presented an interesting juxtaposition between the bazaar, 
and the at the time recently revitalized Krakowskie Przedmieście Street, as well as 
between “provincial Praga on the right bank of the Vistula river and historical center of 
Warsaw on the left bank” (Sulima, 2012, p. 244).  The function of these dichotomies is 
mythological, following the Barthes tradition, and the most important dichotomy 
between East and West (Asia and Europe) was running through the middle of the 10
th
-
Anniversary Stadium, as Sulima acutely observed.    
Once the construction of the new National Stadium has been completed (fig. 
10), the discourse in the media reflected on its historical importance, evoking images of 
resurrection that signified resurrection from the ruins of the past and determined to look 
to the future.  That image presented the stadium as more than a construction, it has been 
called a symbol.  It has been described as a symbol of resurrection that emerged from 
the ruins, showing the world its new face and wanting to prove that it has overcome the 
shadows of the past: the crimes of the Nazis, the communist suppression, and the wild 
capitalism during the time of transformation (Follath & Puhl, 2012).  The National 
Stadium is also bridging the gap that existed between the center of the capitol, such as 
the Old Town and the Palace of Culture and Science, and Praga on the outskirts of 
Warsaw.  Hence, the mythological dichotomies between East and West are undergoing 
a transformation     
The stadiums, old and new, have been national symbols of two versions of the 
same nation.  One could argue that the new stadium signified a symbolic extension of 
the old, indicating that architectural changes in a semiotic landscape do not necessarily 
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erase memory.  The design of the National Stadium includes Poland’s national colors, 
white and red, wrapping around the stadium; the chairs inside the stadium are silver and 
red, signifying a modernized version of those colors.  And outside of the stadium?  
There is a small strip filled with market stalls.  A renaissance of the bazaar. 
 
 
Figure 10. National Stadium (Stadion Narodowy) in Warsaw.  
 
In a recent interview with Gazeta Wyborcza, professor and cultural 
anthropologist Wojciech Burszta, elaborated why bazaars and markets continue to be 
popular in Poland (Aksamit, March 2014).  He mentions the general appeal of markets 
as creating an environment that encourages and inspires social interaction, calling it the 
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pro-social function of such places.  One of his observations addresses the more 
immediate nature of markets where customers pay with cash instead of using a credit 
card in a supermarket, thus using “real” money.  The immediacy and “realness” of this 
experience showcases the process of dissociation, as defined in the theory of 
dissociation and dimensional accrual (Kramer, 2012).  The bazaar experience is 
connected to a need for association; Burszta (Aksamit, March 2014) explains in his 
interview that as a society, we all originally come from a village and even if we move to 
cities, a bazaar is culturally close to us, we have it in our blood.   He also speaks of the 
transformation of the bazaar from being perceived as somewhat embarrassing in the 
early 1990s, to becoming fashionable and a tourist attraction.   
The mythologization of the semiotic space of bazaars highlights the underlying 
need for human communication.  In the case of Poland, bazaars have become desirable 
outside of Warsaw as well, with regional efforts to revive that semiotic public sphere, 
where bazaars and markets constitute “cultural anchors” (Burszta, quoted in Aksamit, 
March 2014).  According to Burszta, bazaars are here to stay; he boldly states that, 
given the rate at which the number of bazaars and market squares is growing, Poles 
need bazaars almost as much as they need air.  So even though Jarmark Europa (Europe 
Bazaar) had to make space for the new stadium, the idea of the bazaar never really 
disappeared.  This answers the question what makes the stadium, in its various 
reincarnations, a national symbol.   
Conclusion 
The historian Norman Davies wrote Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland’s 
present and published it in 1984, later adding an additional chapter to the 2001 edition 
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since so much has happened in the years between the first publication and the new 
edition.  One of the passages from the original text paints a more general, and still 
current, picture of what makes Poland the nation that it is, addressing some questions 
that are at the very heart (yes, that was intended) of the present study.  This study 
proposed some answers to those questions, some more satisfying than others, prompting 
more questions.  Here is a poignant quote.    
The fate of Poland, in fact, prompts reflections on the deepest aspects of history 
and human mortality….about the essential attributes of human society, indeed of 
human nature.  If Poland were indeed destroyed, how then could it later be 
revived?  If Poland did resurrect, then surely something must have survived its 
physical destruction.  In short, when the Body Politick dies, what is it exactly, if 
anything, that remains?  To these questions, as old as Plato, the Marxists have 
no clear answer.  The Catholics will argue by analogy from the fate of an 
individual sinner, and will talk of the nation’s ‘soul’.  The Romantics talk of 
Poland’s ‘Spirit’….When active, in the lengthy span of its lifetime, old Poland 
played a prominent part in the pageant of Europe’s historic nations.  When 
destroyed, as the Dead Man of Europe, it still had a part to play.  Evidently, 
there is life after Partitions.  (Norman Davies, Heart of Europe, first published 
1984, new edition 2001, p. 277 
 
Throughout this study, the author attempted to show what national symbols are and the 
role they play in social change.  The theory of dimensional accrual and dissociation has 
been applied in tandem with semiotics to offer a hermeneutics of national symbols.  
Although the ramifications of this study as well as the method of semiotics are limited, 
they offer a fresh perspective how to recognize what national symbols are and to 
understand how they can affect social change.  The study confirms the validity of the 
tenets of the consciousness structures and their usefulness when investigating the 
meaning of symbols in communities, furthering the understanding of intercultural and 
international communication.   
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As scholars of communication and mindful citizens of this planet, we need to be 
aware of perceptual differences when we study intercultural and international contexts.  
Meaning does not exist in a vacuum and we need to be taught the semiotic system if we 
want to understand the meaning of the symbols that belong to it.  It is unwise to impose 
one’s own agency onto conventional systems and expecting those systems to change.  In 
order to affect social change we must know the conventionality of the respective sign 
system and employ symbols that have meaning to that particular community we are 
trying to affect.  We cannot think without the sign system of a language, we do not have 
an identity without language, and we do not know meaning without language.  By 
knowing such a sign system and being part of the linguistic community, we have access 
to symbols that have the power to evoke a response from the community and potentially 
mobilize its members to challenge the status quo.  
National symbols, when conflated with nationalist discourse, have the capacity 
to provoke controversies between competing ideologies and memories.  The theory of 
dimensional accrual and dissociation has the potential to demonstrate how national 
symbols can move back and forth on the spectrum of the consciousness structures, 
eliciting different interpretations contingent on specific symbol systems.  
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